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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to compare the political 
efforts of two, similar, public interest group coalitions, 
and to analyze the reasons for the failure of the one and 
the success of the other.
A detailed study of the Alaska Public Interest Coaliton, 
which operated from 1969 until 19 74 and the Alaska Lands 
Coalition, which operated from 1978 until 1980, was under­
taken. Areas of study included the strategies and tactics 
each employed in seeking to influence ..Congress, the President 
and the Courts.
It was found that the Alaska Public Interest Coalition 
was a narrow-based coalition, which concentrated mainly on 
legal maneuvers and congressional testimony, while the 
Alaska Lands Coalition was a broad-based coalition, which 
concentrated on personal lobbying, grass-root support, and 
utilization of Presidential influence.
The results suggest that the usefulness of the information 
a coalition provides, the methods of its presentation, and the 
choice of individuals the coalition seeks to influence, all play 
an important role in determining the success or failure of a 
public interest group coalition.
vi
PARTICIPATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL COALITIONS 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY
CHAPTER ONE
- The development of public policy has long been a major 
concern of political scientists. Much effort has been de­
voted in attempts to categorize and explain the complicated 
processes and sequences of events involved in its formation 
and implementation. Knowledge about the role of interest 
groups in this process is basic to a clear understanding 
of the subject.
Discussions on the origin, nature and activities of 
interest groups in American politics can be traced back to 
James Madison. He argued that one of the virtues of the 
then proposed Union would be its ability to, "Break and 
control the voilence of faction...The regulation of these 
various and interfering interests forms the principle task 
of modern legislation."^- Madison's thinking about factions 
was widely appreciated in his day, but it underscored 
the deep ambivalence toward such groups that has always 
existed. Since his time the prevailing opinion about 
groups has changed many times.
No such ambivalence existed in the mind of John C.
Calhoun. According to Peter Drucker,
What makes Calhoun so important as a major 
key in the understanding of American politics
Ijames Madison, The Federalist Papers, "Federalist Paper 
Number 10," (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 79.
2
is not just that he saw the importance in 
American political life of sectional and 
interest pluralism,... But Calhoun, perhaps 
alone, saw in it more than just a rule of 
expedience, imposed by a country's size 
...He saw in it a basic principle of free 
government.2
In this century, political theorists have viewed society
as an aggregation of competing interest groups. Chief
among such thinkers is Arthur Bentley, who, in The Process
of Government (first published in 1908) wrote:
We shall never find a group interest of the 
society as a whole. We shall always find 
that the political interests and activities 
of any given group--and there are no political 
phenomena except group phenomena— are directed 
against the activities of men, who appear in 
other groups, political or otherwise... The 
society itself is nothing other than the 
complex of the groups that compose it.^
Bentley saw the activities of groups as fundamental to both
the economic and political arenas. "The great task in the
study of any social life is the analysis of these groups," he
explained, "When the groups are adequately stated, everything 
4
is stated."
Virginia Held, in her discussion of preponderance theor­
ies, says this about Bentley:
In Bentley's view, every group has an interest.
He uses the terms, in fact, almost interchang-
ably. (For him) it is the individual apart
from the group which is artificial. '"The indivi-
2 . . .Michael P. Smith, ed. American Politics and Public
Policy, "A Key to American Politics: Calhoun's Pluralism" 
(New York: Random House, 1973), p. 27.
3
Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1908), p. 222.
4 Ibid., p. 208-209.
4dual stated for himself, and invested with an 
extra social unity of his own, is a fiction."'5
However, it is important to note that Bentley does, on the
whole, think that the resulting outcome of this group
interaction is generally acceptable. As Mancur Olson wrote,
Not only was the resultant of all the group 
pressures always the determinant of social 
policy, but it was also, in Bentley's mind, 
a reasonably just determinant. Groups had 
a degree of power more or less in proportion
to their numbers. The larger, more nearly
general interest would usually tend to 
defeat the smaller, narrow special interest.6
A basic assumption which underlies this thinking is that 
a group may form, composed of interests outside the formal 
structure of government, and actively (and often effectively) 
work towards influencing governmental policy. This assump­
tion is commonly referred to as the pluralist perspective, 
and over the years it has received support from many distin­
guished theorists. For example, Robert Dahl, in his book,
— ace t° Democratic Theory, wrote that there is a, "High
probability that an active and legitimate group in the pop­
ulation can make itself heard effectively at some crucial
stage in the process of d e c i s i o n . " 7 The foundation of Amer­
ican pluralist thinking rests on the belief that any group 
which organizes and operates within the boundaries established
^Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual 
Interests (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 79.
^Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action 
(New York: Schocken Books^ 1968), p. 121.
^Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 145.
by society has a chance to achieve effective access in the 
government's decision-making process. This is one of the
g
central points in Bentley's argument, and similar thinking
9
can.be traced to current times, from Mydral in 1944, Truman
in 1950,10 Dahl (again) in 1961,11 Milbrath in 1963,12
13 14MacFarland m  1969, and Held in 1970.
Of course, over the years pluralist thinking has been 
subject to a certain amount of criticism. This criticism 
has centered on the pluralist assumption that all groups 
will have an equal opportunity to gain access into the 
policy-making process. Ornstein and Elder, in Interest 
Groups, Lobbying and Po1icymaking, discuss those theorists 
who find problems implicit in pluralistic thinking. Promin­
ent in this category is E.E. Schattschneider, who, "Attacked 
the operation of groups in the American political process 
on the basis of what he regarded as a profound upper-class
g
Gunnar Mydral, An American Dilemma (New York; Harper 
and Brothers, 1944), p. 80.
9Ibid.
"^David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1950).
■^Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1961.
12Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago; 
Rand McNally, 1965).
13Andrew S. McFarland, Public Interest Lobbies (Washing­
ton D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976).
14Held. Public Interests and Individual Interests.
6bias and distortion by the groups of the public i n t e r e s t 15
In The Semi-Sovereign People he said:
The vice of groupist theory is that it 
conceals the most significant aspects of 
the system. The flaw of the pluralist 
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings 
with a strong upper-class accent. Probably 
about ninety percent of the people cannot 
get into the pressure system.1 ®
In 196 9, Theodore Lowi.claimed, in his book The End 
of Liberalism, that the notion of interest groups as both 
good and necessary meant that government was losing its 
basic sense of authority by handing over to private groups 
the ability to determine the direction of policy develop­
ment. The result, he felt, was distorted and unrepresenta­
tive policy, benefitting the few and corrupting the function­
ing of government. 1 *^
Critics of pluralist philosophy such as Lowi, Schatt- 
schneider, and Mancur Olson believe that the American system 
is, in fact, not open to all groups seeking access to the 
decision making process. Those most likely to succeed are 
groups which represent powerful, well-financed interests, 
while others, even if they represent the "public goodj" are 
likely to fail either because they are underfinanced, or lack 
the expertise necessary to achieve effective access.
-^Norman J. Ornstein and Shirley Elder, Interest Groups, 
Lobbying, and Policymaking (Washington D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 1978), p. 14-15.
l^E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 35.
^Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 
1969), p. 40-41.
In recent years, attention concerning the success of 
group participation in the development of public policy has 
been focused, in part, on public interest groups, A public 
interest group may be defined as one which seeks a collective 
good, the achievement of which will not selectively benefit 
the membership or the activists of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . D a v i d  
Truman, in The Governmental Process, tells of the need for 
an interest group to speak in terms of "the public interest." 
When a group is perceived as working on behalf of a public 
good or necessity, he believes that its chance for success 
is greatly increased.
When trying to influence public policy , a public 
interest group can choose from a variety of strategies and 
tactics. A strategy may be defined as a broad plan of attack, 
or a general approach. A tactic, on the other hand, is a 
specific action designed to influence a policy decision.
Within a strategy, therefore, there are numerous tactics 
available.
Jeffrey M. Berry, in Lobbying For The People, notes 
four "strategies of influence," available to public interest 
groups. These are: Law, embarassment and confrontation, 
information, and constituency influence and pressure.
The first of these, legal action, is effective as both 
a primary, as well as a secondary, strategy. As a primary
ISjeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying For The People (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 7.
1 9Ibid., pp. 263-272.
action, the law may be used to obtain a temporary injunction 
allowing time for action to be taken outside the courts. Or 
it may be used by those groups who still want to work within 
the system, without having to 'stoop to politics.'^ por 
other groups, it is an alternative to be used when all 
else fails. It must be remembered though, that unless the 
constitutionality of the controversial action is being 
tested, injunctions are nearly always temporary, likely 
to be appealed, and often decided outside the courtsr
Embarassment and confrontation includes tactics such
as political protests, whistle blowing, and shareholders
actions; and is normally used only by groups which will not
be listened to, or cannot achieve access through normal
channels. Schattschneider states that:
Private conflicts are taken into the 
public arena precisely because someone 
wants to make certain that the power 
ratio among private interests most 
immediately involved shall not prevail.21
Groups which employ the third strategy, information, 
rely on such tactics as personal lobbying, congressional 
testimony, and releasing research results and internal
9 9 . . .publicity to the press. This is an important activity 
for many public interest groups. It is less hostile in 
nature than embarassment and confrontation, and it assumes 
a good working relationship with Congress.
9 nBerry, Lobbying For The People, p. 267.
^-^-Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, p. 38.
22eerry, Lobbying For The People, p. 269.
9Berry believes that groups which are characterized
by the fourth strategy, constituency and pressure, come
23closest to fitting the image of a "pressure group. 11 
Utilization of this strategy involves tactics such as 
urging members to write their Congressmen, publicizing 
voting records, and (if possible) making campaign contributions 
supporting or opposing a decision-maker's re-election bid.
While public interest groups may sometimes be class­
ified as special interest groups, there are a few key dis­
tinctions. A special interest group will seek benefits which 
occur primarily to its members, while a public interest 
group seeks benefits which occur throughout society. Very 
often they are non-profit organizations, relying on volunteer 
efforts to a greater extent than most special interest 
groups. Additionally, their memberships are usually composed 
of private individuals, who pay a membership fee to be a part 
of the organization. Examples of public interest groups 
include consumer activist groups and environmental organ­
izations .
Berry also notes the contributions of public interest
groups in American political life. In addition to shaping
the political agenda by bringing new issues into public
view, and using litigation to perform a type of "law
enforcement" function by obtaining judicial rulings:
Public interest groups play an important 
role in facilitating the political partici­
pation of their members and related attentive
23Berryf Lobbying for the People, p. 271.
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publics. The organizations not only activate 
supporters and constituents, but they also 
provide meaningful channels through which 
participation can be directed.^4
One of the most potentially important actions a public
interest group can take is to form a coalition with other,
like-minded groups. Berry noted that seventy-six percent
of the public interest activists he surveyed described
"joint activity with other organizations," as "important"
or "very important."25 James Deakin, in his book The
Lobbyists, notes that virtually every major issue that
comes before Congress involves some cross lobbying or
intergroup lobbying, and that lobbyists generally put
much faith in such efforts.2 6 Cooperative lobbying such
as this may be defined simply as efforts of an alliance of
interest groups (however temporary or unstable) to influence 
27government.
In Lobbying For The People, Berry describes three 
types of alliances, or coalitions, in which public interest 
groups are involved. The first, dependent coalitions, are: 
Those where one group dominates in both
^Berry, Lobbying For The People, p. 2 87.
2^Ibid., p . 254.
^James Deakin, The Lobbyists,(Washington D.C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1966), p. 219.
^Donald R. Hall, Cooperative Lobbying. The Power of 
Pressure (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1969), p.~xi.
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active participation and resource commitment.
Other groups will act in concert with the 
dominant group during major lobbying efforts, 
but their participation in the coalition's 
decision-making tends to be of a secondary 
nature.2 8
In the second type, called a participatory coalition,
No one group is dominant, although a single 
member group may have a major leadership 
or coordinating role. At least two organ­
izations are highly active and supportive 
in a participatory coalition...Most frequently 
participatory coalitions are ad hoc working 
arrangements that do not lend themselves 29
to institutionalized or permanent arrangements.
Finally, independent coalitions are those which tend to
have a, "much greater permanence than participatory
coalitions as well as an independent staff and a distinct
30identity from a member group."
Various authors have given reasons for this inclination
to form coalitions. Donald Hall, in Cooperative Lobbying -
The Power of Pressure, states that, "Economic self-interest
31is probably the m a m  motive behind group cooperation."
He also mentions the benefits of information exchange, shared 
goals and ideology, and the appearance of a unified front 
in Congress.
Organization structure and base of support are of 
particular interest to Abraham Holtzman. In Interest Groups 
and Lobbying, he describes the importance for a coalition
28Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 265.
3 0 Ibid., p. 258.
31Hall, Cooperative Lobbying, p. 46.
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to, "Threaten to marshal its mass membership base against 
the legislator during the next e l e c t i o n , "32 and notes 
that:
Failure to create an association of groups 
may result in a babble of voices being 
heard, none of which are really concerned 
with the interests of the others in the 
more inclusive groups of which they are 
members.33
Even if the various groups share common goals or ideology, 
without the control of a central organization to set policy 
and coordinate actions, confusion and disarray is usually 
the result. This could have the effect of splintering the 
group, and removing the reason for joining the coalition 
to begin with.
Questions about whether or not to join an interest 
group, or coalition of interest groups, to begin with, high­
lights Mancur Olson's thinking. In The Logic of Collective 
Action, he stated that rational individuals have little real 
incentive to participate in large interest groups (or 
coalitions) because the costs of participation will usually 
exceed any joint payoffs.
Olson suggested that individuals joined in 
collective or group activity only when 
membership provided selective benefits,
(for example recreational, social or 
economic), when membership is compulsory 
(for example a closed union shop), or 
where the group is small enough that an 
individual feels he or she is vital to
32Abraham Holtzman, Interest Groups and Lobbying (New 
York: The MacMillian Company, 1966), p. 27.
33ibid., p . 37.
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the group's success.^
What lies underneath the surface of this thinking is 
the belief that broad public interest groups, or public 
interest group coalitions, will rarely be successful 
because there are too few incentives for individuals to
o c
actively participate. J
A lobbying organization..I working in the 
interests of a large group of firms or 
workers in some industry, would get no 
assistance from the rational individuals 
in that industry. This would be true 
even if everyone in the industry were 
absolutely convinced that the proposed 
program was in their best interest.36
Hall also notes the obstacles that can sometimes hinder
effective coalition formation:
Group alliances may be discouraged by many 
factors, the more important of which may be 
...the existence of jurisdictional problems 
severe enough to cause continuing friction 
and thus prevent logical cooperation... groups 
may be afraid to cooperate with each other 
for fear of adverse reaction from the 
press, public, government and other alliances,
(and) there may exist prohibitive situational 
factors largely not under control of the 
group.37
The subject of this study will be a specific type 
of public interest coalition— those composed of environ­
mental organizations. These are groups which are concerned
34ornstein and Elder, Interest Groups, Lobbying and 
Policy Making, p. 17.
3 5Ibid., p. 18
3^Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, p. 127. 
37nall, Cooperative Lobbying, p. 127.
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about the impact of mankind on his natural surroundings. 
Their activities include fighting for strict controls on 
pollution, advocating the development of ‘clean' energy 
sources such as solar power, and seeking to limit or ban 
altogether, development of wilderness areas. Initally 
receiving attention during the late sixties, one of the 
first major legislative victories for the environmentalist 
movement was the enactment of the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, which followed the Santa Barbara oil 
spill of that same year. Since that time the legislative 
record of the environmental movement Jtias been varied; it 
has been overshadowed at times by such issues as the war 
in Viet Nam and the energy crisis.
From 1969 to 1973 and again in 1978 to 1980, Congress 
and the President were forced to confront two Alaskan 
issues of particular concern to environmental organizations. 
The first was the decision to build the Alaskan pipeline, 
and the other was the settlement of federal land claims 
in the state. Both issues drew considerable attention from 
environmental organizations, and both necessitated the 
formation of coalitions to effectively lobby the appropriate 
Congressional decision-makers. What makes these two 
examples especially interesting is that in each case the 
coalitions were comprised of almost identical groups, and 
had similar goals? yet in 197 3 the environmental coalition 
failed, whereas in 1980 it was successful. This raises 
several interesting questions. Why was the environmental 
coalition successful in one instance and unsuccessful in
15
the other? Were similar tactics of influence employed in 
each situation? What lessons about coalition formation from 
1973 were the coalition members able to apply in the period 
197.8 to 1980?
The purpose of this study will be to explore these 
questions in order to examine the formation of public 
interest group coalitions, and their participation in the 
policy development process. The issues and concepts 
discussed earlier provide the theoretical framework which 
will guide the study. Whether or not the ideas regarding 
interest groups, coalition formation, and policy development 
as expressed by these authors are applicable to the afore­
mentioned situations will become apparent during the course 
of this study. In any case, the Alaskan pipeline and the 
Alaska lands issue both provide excellent means for studying 
the activities of public interest group coalition participa­
tion in the governmental process. Both coalitions sought 
to influence public policy, were involved in congressional 
lobbying, received much attention from the press and from 
scholarly researchers, and put much time, effort, and faith 
in their actions. Whatever they may be, the reasons for the 
coalition*s failure in 1973 and its success in 1980 will 
provide the basis for the conclusions to be reached by this 
study.
Chapter two will focus on the passage of the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, concentrating on the 
coalition involved, the tactics they employed in Congress, 
and the outcome of their participation. This will be
16
followed by a similar analysis of the development of the 
Alaska lands bill in chapter three. In chapter four a 
comparison of the two cases will be made, contrasting 
the strategies and tactics of the first coalition with that 
of the second, in an attempt to understand why the coalition 
failed in 1973 and was successful seven years later.
Awareness of the strategies used by the coalitions, 
knowing why they were chosen, and understanding why they may 
or may not have been successful will be useful in comparing 
the two situations. This, in turn, will be helpful in 
arriving at some conclusions regarding public interest 
groups and coalition formation, which well be contained in 
chapter five. "
CHAPTER TWO
The possibility of oil deposits existing in Alaska 
was known to the United States government almost from the 
turn of the century. Several American companies tried to 
enter geologic survey claims on the North Slope, inside the 
Arctic Circle, in 1921.-*- That action served to raise the 
interest of the government. Prior to World War I, it had 
been setting aside petroleum reserves to assure a fuel 
supply for U. S. naval ships: Elk Hills and Buena Vista in 
California in 1912, and Teapot Dome in Wyoming in 1915. 
President Warren G. Harding added the largest of all in 
1923: Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 4, a tract of twenty- 
three million acres on the western North Slope of Alaska.
After World War II, some smaller oil companies began 
exploration on areas surrounding Petroleum Reserve Number 
4. In 1957, the Richfield Oil Corporation of California 
drilled a successful well nearby. "Further wells confirmed 
a field estimated at 175 million barrels. Natural gas 
deposits were also found, and a few years later, another 
oil f i e l d . B y  the late 1960's more than fifty onshore 
wells were operating, but the quantities thus far located
-*-James P. Roscow, 800 Miles to Valdez (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 52.
2Ibid.
2Ibid., p. 53.
17
18
were not sufficient to justify a major undertaking. As
Bryan Cooper said in his book Alaska - The Last Frontier,
It was not good enough just to find oil.
There had to be enough of it to be worth
producing commercially... The main problem 
was finding a reserve large enough to 
justify economic recovery from this remote 
and harsh region.4
That is exactly what happened in February, 1968.
At that time ARCO sunk a well into Prudhoe Bay, offshore 
from the North Slope. By June, the existence of an oil 
field containing an estimated ten billion barrels had been 
confirmed. Prudhoe Bay is still the largest petroleum 
deposit ever discovered in the United States. It was also
about one hundred times more oil than anyone had ever
discovered in Northern Alaska.
In Anchorage, on February 10, 1969, the three major 
lease holders in the area--Atlantic Richfield, British 
Petroleum, and Humble Oil (Exxon)— announced their intention 
to build a pipeline. After studying the various alternatives 
they felt that this was the most practical way to transport 
the oil from its current, almost inaccessable, location.
It was to be a forty-eight inch wide line, running eight 
hundred miles from Prudhoe Bay, south to Valdez, a small 
fishing village on the Gulf of Alaska, with an ice-free 
deep water port. Here it would be loaded on to giant tank­
ers, and taken to existing refineries on the west coast of 
the United States. The pipeline was to be owned by an
4
Bryan Cooper, Alaska - The Last Frontier (London: 
Hutchinson and Company, 1972), p. 77.
19
organization known as TAPS [Trans-Alaska Pipeline System] 
which in turn was to be owned by the pipeline subsidiaries 
of the three partners. In the future if other companies 
needed to bring oil from Prudhoe Bay, they would be invited 
to share in the pipeline's o w n e r s h i p . ^
When the full extent of the reserve became known, other 
oil companies began purchasing land leases around Prudhoe 
Bay. Eventually TAPS would be succeeded by the Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Company, composed of the three original 
members of TAPS, plus Mobil Oil Company, Phillips Petroleum, 
Union Oil of California, Amerada Hess Corporation, and Home 
Oil of Canada (which later dropped out of the project) .
To begin construction, no matter where the location, 
permits are required, and in Alaska the immediate construc­
tion problem was not the pipeline. The first priority was 
to build an all-weather supply road to move the heavy con­
struction equipment and supplies to places where they were 
needed. Through 1968 there was no road at all north of the 
Yukon River, and in 1969 the only existing route was a 
roughly cut trail, dubbed the "Hickel Highway," after 
Alaska's governor Walter J. Hickel, and it was only use­
ful until the spring thaw.^
In the past, as James P. Roscow notes in his book 
800 Miles to Valdez, pipeliners seldom had trouble getting 
permits. Even before Humble and ARCO sent their first
^Roscow, 800 Miles to Valdez, p. 21.
^Cooper, Alaska - The Last Frontier, p. 224.
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engineers to Alaska, they requested and received permits
to start field s u r v e y s . 7 However,
To build a pipeline through virgin wilderness 
— with a road needed to start construction, 
and a new terminal to be built from bedrock 
up— would likely require an unusual number 
of permits.8
These, it seemed, were not going to be granted quickly.
There were two problems: the first was that Alaska was
almost entirely public land. The Alaska Statehood Act
of 19 59 gave the state the right to select 103.5 million
acres of land as state land, but this had not yet been
done. Secondly, the statehood law barred state selection
of any land historically claimed by Alaska's Native Eskimo
population. Again, little work had been done to resolve
conflicting claims.^
On June 6, 1969* TAPS filed an application for
An oil pipeline right-of-way, together 
with two additional rights-of-way for 
ingress and egress to the primary right- 
of-way, and eleven pumping plant sites 
for the construction of a 48-inch diameter 
oil pipeline system...The primary purpose 
[to be] for the transportation of liquid 
crude petroleum from the North Slope of 
Alaska to a marine terminal at Port Valdez10
On that same day Undersecretary of Interior Russell Train
sent TAPS a list of seventy-nine questions on technical and
^Roscow, 800 Miles to Valdez, p. 32.
8Ibid.
8Ibid., p. 32-33; see also Mary C. Berry, The Alaska 
Pipeline, chapter three.
■^Hughs, George, letter to Bureau of Land Management, 
Anchorage and Fairbanks, June 6, 1969.
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environmental aspects of the project, designed, according 
to Train, "...to indicate the kind of questions to which 
satisfactory answers will be required before permits can 
be given for the use of public lands."H
In late June, Interior Secretary Hickel notified TAPS
that,
Permits would be granted as expeditiously 
as possible, once Interior, the Congress, 
and appropriate federal and state agencies 
were satisfied that all legal, regulatory, 
and environmental requirements had been met.-^
One interesting note is that at this time, [summer of
196 9] Congress was working toward passing the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. As mentioned earlier,
this was to become a major tool for influencing public
policy in the late 1970's. The relevant section of the NEPA
states that,
All agencies of the federal government shall 
to the fullest extent possible, include in 
every recommendation or report or proposal 
for legislation and other major federal 
actions significantly effecting the quality 
of the human environment, a detailed state­
ment on environmental impact...as well as 
the alternatives which were considered.
That August,.after securing permission from Congres­
sional Interior Committees, Hickel gave his approval allowing 
TAPS to build a fifty-five mile section of the haul road
•^Train, Undersecretary of Interior Russell E., letter 
to R.E. Dulaney, June 10, 1969. Quoted in Mary C. Berry, 
The Alaska Pipeline, p. 106.
l^Roscow, 800 Miles to Valdez, p. 33.
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13from Fairbanks to the south banks of the Yukon. This
was to be the first permanent road which ever reached as
far north as the Yukon, but it still was not enough. The
final road would have to be two hundred and sixty miles long
and eventually reach Prudhoe Bay.
During this same time the Department of Interior and
TAPS set out to remove the last remaining obstacles: securing
final permission to build the pipeline and the road to
support it. In August, hearings were begun before House and
Senate Interior Committees, working toward an early approval
which would allow construction to begin that winter. It was
for the purpose of testifying at these hearings that the
environmental coalition first came into existence.
Composed principally of four groups— the Sierra Club,
Friends of the Earth, the Environmental Defense Fund, and
the Wilderness Society--they testified before the House
and Senate, although concentrating in the Senate probably
because of the perceived sympathetic views of Senator Henry
14Jackson. (D-WA) David Brower, founder of the Friends of
the Earth, "testified to the Senate that the proposed
construction stipulations had loopholes you could float the
15Manhattan through." {Reference to the oil supertanker 
which attempted unsuccessfully to make a journey through 
the Northwest Passage in 1969, thereby eliminating the
13Roscow, 800 Miles to Valdez, p. 33.
14Cooper, Alaska - The Last Frontier, p. 223.
15Roscow, 800 Miles to Valdez, p. 34.
possibility of loading the crude oil directly onto super­
tankers from Prudhoe Bay.]
Next, on September 19, the Native Alaskan villages 
which claimed land over the proposed pipeline route signed 
over their claims to the right-of-way,^ in return for 
concessions from TAPS. Then on September 30, the Interior 
Department published a set of stipulations regarding con­
struction of the pipeline. According to Mary C. Berry,
The thirty-four pages of stipulations 
were touted as the most rigid controls 
ever imposed upon a private construction 
project by the government. In fact, the 
burden of applying them rested largely 
upon the Bureau of Land Management 
personnel in the field, who would be 
working alongside the construction 
crews, supervising the project. The 
idea was that these supervisors would 
make sure TAPS and its contractors 
obeyed the stipulations, and would 
close down construction if they did 
not, or when a question arose which 
could not be answered in the field.
Finally, on October 1, Secretary Hickel asked Congress
to approve the entire project. After more than two months
of deliberation, in which many environmental issues were
raised, the House and Senate Interior Committees notified
Secretary Hickel on December 11 that they would now allow
permits to be issued.
However, Senator Jackson made it clear 
that his committee was worried about the 
environmental effects of the pipeline.
1 6Mary C. Berry, The Alaska Pipeline (Bloomington, Ind. 
Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 110.
17Ibid., p. 111.
2.4
He also let the Secretary know that the 
committee had considered, and rejected, 
the option of evaluating the pipeline 
itself. It took expertise the committee 
did not have. Senator Jackson concluded 
his letter with a mention of the NEPA, 
then agreed upon in its final form by a 
Senate-House conference committee and 
about to be submitted to both houses 
for a last v o t e . 18
Secretary Hickel did not immediately issue the permits, 
even though he now clearly had the authority. His intent 
was to first issue a permit allowing construction of the 
haul road, and issue later permits as they became necessary.
In January of 19 70, TAPS issued letters of intent to 
construction companies from the Yukon to Prudhoe B a y . 1 9  
A short time later, these companies, anticipating firm 
contracts, began moving their equipment from Fairbanks up 
the partially re-opened Hickel Highway to convenient staging 
points along the haul road's tentative route.^0 Secretary 
Hickel was at the point of issuing the necessary permit 
when a two-fold crisis arose and effectively stopped any 
further activity.
First the Alaskan Natives acted. As was mentioned 
earlier, the natives with land claims along the proposed 
route of the pipeline had signed waivers to allow the pipe­
line to pass through their property. Now they claimed that 
an assurance of jobs promised to them by TAPS was not being
l^Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 115.
19Ibid., p. 116.
20Ibid.
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honored. On March 9, 1970, five village associations filed
suit in Federal District Court in Washington D.C., seeking
to prevent Secretary Hickel from granting any permits for
construction on the claimed land. Judge George L. Hart
21agreed and issued a temporary restraining order.
Next, the environmental coalition took legal action.
The Center for Law and Social Policy, on behalf of its
clients— -the Wilderness Society, the Environmental Defense
Fund, and the Friends of the Earth--filed a complaint for
"Declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary
22of the Interior." They claimed that the permit Hickel
intended to issue would violate the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, which restricted rights-of-way to fifty feet; twenty-
five feet on each side of whatever was being built. (TAPS'
June 6, 196 9 application was for a right-of-way of one hundred
feet.) On April 6, the coalition amended their suit to
charge that the project also failed to comply with the impact
statement requirement of the NEPA.
The coalition was represented by James W. Moorman,
who left the Justice Department's Land and Natural Resources
Division the previous summer to join the new Center for
23Law and Social Policy.
21Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 118.
22Lynton K. Caldwell, Lynton R. Hayes and Isabel 
MacWhirter, Citizens and the Environment (Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 66.
23Richard Corrigan "Settlement of Native Land Claims 
Could Affect Alaska Pipeline Controversy," National Journal 3 
(April 17, 1971); p. 84.
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On April 13, Judge Hart heard the case in Washington 
D.C. District Court. After listening to arguments from 
Moorman, TAPS lawyers, and a Justice Department Lawyer 
named Herbert Pittle, Judge Hart asked Moorman what relief 
he sought:
The lawyer [Moorman] replied that since 
the Interior Department was about to 
give its permission for the road to be 
built, his clients would like a prelimi­
nary injunction until the case could be 
tried on its merits, and two weeks 
notice of the Departments intent to 
issue the permit. "Fair enough," said
the J u d g e . 2 4
When Pittle protested, Judge Hart replied, "The road and 
pipeline are all one thing. The method you propose would 
violate the Environmental Policy Act and the Mineral Leasing 
Act. You can't violate the law just by spending a billion 
dollars to do it."25 judge Hart therefore issued an injunc­
tion preventing the construction of the pipeline. On April
2 614, he issued a second injunction against the haul road.
Thus, in less than two months of legal maneuvers the Alaskan 
pipeline and the road needed to build it had been completely 
stopped.
The first action TAPS took was to reorganize. In August 
of 197 0 TAPS became the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company. 
Alyeska's first goal was to settle the Native Alaskan claims. 
Until that was done, permit applications could not be con-
^Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 120.
25Ibid., p. 120-121.
^Roscow, 800 Miles to Valdez, p. 61.
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sidered.
Resolving the Native land claims proved to be a
complicated process, with Alyeska and the Alaska Federation
of Natives (AFN) cooperating much of the way. Working at
various times with the Vice-President's Council of Indian
Opportunity, the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Public
Land Management, the Office of Management and Budget, and
a variety of aids and administrative assistants, they were
able to formulate an administrative bill which satisfied
most of the Natives' claims. Among other things, the bill
included $500 million in royalities and over 40 million acres
27of land; mostly contiguous to their villages.
On December 13, 1971, after an equally arduous time in 
Congress, a Senate-House conference committee compromised 
on a bill that was generally acceptable to everyone. Called 
"The Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971," it gave 
the Natives the right to select 44 million acres of land.
For relinquishing any future claims they were to receive $4 6 2 
million over an eleven year period, plus a two percent 
royality payment until they had been paid an additional $500 
million. The ANCSA was signed into law by President Nixon on
o o
December 18, 1971.
Passage of the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act 
was a major step toward the approval of the pipeline, and 
ended the controversy over state land ownership for the time
27Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 160. See also chapters 
seven and eight.
28Ibid., p. 214.
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being. However, the environmental lawsuits and other 
federal injunctions still remained, and the Interior 
Department1s environmental impact statement was not 
yet complete.
In the meantime, the State of Alaska and the Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Company were allowed to intervene in
the Wilderness Society vs. Hickel, in support of the pipe-
29line. Alyeska's position was clear. The state, on the 
other hand, was concerned with the revenues which would 
be raised after the pipeline was approved. Appearing before 
an Interior Department hearing, Governor William A.. Egan, 
after outlining the state's plans to protect the environ­
ment, said:
Without the money gained from development 
of our natural resources, we cannot pay 
for schools to educate people, we cannot 
pay for medical programs to keep them 
healthy, we cannot remedy any of the sources, 
and we cannot eliminate any of the human 
miseries of which Alaska has had more than 
its share of for so long.*^
On the other side, the Honorable David Anderson,
British Colombian member of Canada's House of Commons,, 
received permission to intervene in opposition, as did 
the one hundred and fifty thousand member Canadian Wild­
life Federation. They opposed the pipeline because it 
necessitated coastal tanker routes, which threatened oil
29Caldwell, Citizens and the Environment, p. 234.
30Corrigan, "Settlement of Native Land Claims," p. 83.
31spills along the Canadian coast.
On March 20, 1972, the Interior Department issued the
final version of its environmental impact statement. It was
nine volumes long— six which dealt with the environmental
impacts and three which were concerned with the economics
32of the project. The final decision on the construction
permit was to come in forty-five days, a waiting period
designed to allow comments on the impact statement.
The coalition members were wary. They urged the
President to ask Secretary Morton to hold public hearings
on the subject. But (Morton) had indicated that he saw no
reason for more public hearings, and Judge Hart refused to 
33order them. Undersecretary of Interior Pecora announced 
that any further hearings would be a "circus," adding 
that it would interfere with more thoughtful and rational 
analysis of this complex document.^
Instead, the coalition put together its own environ­
mental impact report and presented it to Secretary Morton 
on May 4. In this new impact statement, the issue of what 
would be called 'The Canadian Alternative,' was first raised 
This was a completely different route for the pipeline, 
taking the oil from Prudhoe Bay, east into Canada through 
the Canadian Northwest Territories, gathering any oil in
31Caldwell, Citizens and the Environment, p. 234.
32Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 228.
33Ibid., p. 233.
34Caldwell, Citizens and the Environment, p. 237.
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production there. The pipeline would then run southeast into
Alberta, where it would connect with existing pipeline systems.
From here the oil would be sent two ways— to Puget Sound on
the-west coast, and also eastward to midwest markets. James
Roscow summarizes the environmental arguments in favor of
this alternative:
A combined Alaska-Canada route would establish 
a route that could be used later for a second 
pipeline to bring natural gas from Prudhoe 
Bay, south to the same markets. The route 
would cross more hospitable country in Canada 
than in Alaska, and it would eliminate the 
need for a tanker port on the sensitive 
fishing waters of the Gulf of Alaska, and 
for the constant tanker voyages up and down 
the Alaska and Canadian waters.^
Charles J. Cicchetti, in his book Alaska Oil: Alternative
Routes and Markets, did a thorough and exhaustive cost-benefit
analysis on the economic aspects of a Canadian pipeline
vs. an Alaskan pipeline. He concluded in favor of the Canadian
alternative:
The economic analysis reveals that the Trans- 
Canada pipeline alternatives are very likely 
to be superior from the standpoint of net 
benefits (cost-benefit ratios) and even tax 
revenue for A l a s k a . 36
In addition to the discussion of the Canadian alternative, 
the coalition criticized the Interior Department's nine 
volume report, calling it a, "Passive document that blandly
^Roscow, 800 Miles to Valdez, p. 180.
^Charles J. Cicchetti, Alaskan Oil: Alternative 
Routes and Markets (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1972), p. 57.
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accepts at face value the fundamental premises of the oil 
c o m p a n i e s . B a s i c a l l y  these premises were that a 
Canadian pipeline would be too expensive to build, would 
take considerably longer to complete (Canada had its own 
unresolved native land claims), and that in a time of 
crisis it was unwise to be dependent on any foreign power 
for supplies of our own oil, no matter how friendly they 
were.
On May 11, 1972, (one week after the forty-five day 
waiting period had expired), the new Secretary of Interior, 
Rodgers C. Morton, announced that he had decided to approve 
the rights-of-way for the p i p e l i n e . ^8 In his announcement 
he compared the two alternatives. A pipeline through 
Canada would damage a greater amount of tundra and perma­
frost, and although a pipeline through Alaska would risk 
earthquake and tanker accidents, Morton, "Felt these were 
protected against."3 9 He also mentioned that a Canadian 
line would take three to four years longer to complete.
After the announcement was made the only remaining 
obstacles were the injunctions instituted by Judge Hart.
On August 15 he lifted these, claiming that the Interior 
Department had met all the legal requirements for the 
permit.40 "The final decision may rest with the Supreme
3 ^ B e r r y ,  The Alaska Pipeline, p. 149.
^Roscow, 800 Miles to Valdez, p. 31.
39lbid.
^Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 354.
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Court," the Judge added. The coalition members, now joined 
by some Canadian groups, immediately appealed the decision 
to the District of Columbia Appellate Court. On February 9, 
1973, the court issued a decision which partially overturned 
Judge Hart's ruling.^ The court did not rule whether 
the project conformed to the NEPA, but instead claimed that 
they had no jurisdiction over the rights-of-way limits in 
the Mineral Leasing Act. Congress had created the Act, and 
only Congress could change it to allow a right-of-way greater 
than fifty feet. This decision was appealed to the Supreme 
Court by the supporters of the pipeline, but it declined 
review.^ The ultimate resolution of the pipeline issue 
now had to be determined by Congress. "
Within a few weeks, work began in Congress. Bills 
came out of both the House and Senate. Congress first 
decided to let the fifty foot limit stand, but amended it 
to allow the Secretary of Interior the power to increase 
a pipeline right-of-way during construction.
Although this resolved the difficulty surrounding 
the Mineral Leasing Act, tougher questions remained about 
the environment and the NEPA. By April 1973, the energy 
crisis was becoming noticable in some parts of the county.
This was especially true in the midwest, where fuel short­
ages had closed some schools the previous winter, and were
4 J - R o s c o w ,  800 Miles to Valdez, p. 87. 
42ibid.
threatening fall harvests.^ Some midwestern Congressmen
began working to have a pipeline go through Canada and into
their own districts.
The latter allied themselves with the conser­
vationists, who realized that energy needs 
made the development of the North Slope 
reserves inevitable and had decided to back A
the Canadian route as the lesser of two evils.
In late June the Senate Interior Committee reported a
bill to the full Senate which would authorize the pipeline
and give the Secretary discretion over the size of the right
of-way:
Regardless of whether the 19 69 decision 
of the owner companies in favor of the 
all-Alaska route was the wisest or the 
most consistent with the national interest 
at that time, and regardless of whether 
the Administration's early commitment in 
favor of that route was made on the basis 
of adequate information and analysis, 
the Committee determined that the Trans- 
Alaska pipeline is now clearly preferable, 
because it could be on stream two to six 
years earlier than a comparable overland 
pipeline accross Canada.
(The emphasis is the Committee's.)
In regard to the request for additional studies of the
Canadian route, the report stated, "It is doubtful...
whether further study could contribute to the accuracy
of such speculations."^
There were to be two major amendments offered to
4^Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 26. 
44Ibid.
45Ibid., p. 163.
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this bill (S-1081) on the floor. The first was a proposal
by Alaskan Senator Mike Gravel to exempt the pipeline
from any further actions under the NEPA. It seems that those
Congressmen and lobbyists favoring the pipeline believed
that just passing a bill authorizing its construction would
not be enough to clear away all the pending lawsuits. Their
solution was an exemption. An August 8, 1973 article in
the National Journal quotes one of Gravel's staff assistants
as saying, "The Senator faced almost unanimous opposition
when he started pushing his amendment. All the state officials
47and the oil companies thought it was a mistake." (Their 
attitudes were to change shortly.)
The other amendment, posed by Senators Walter Mondale,
(D-Minn.) and Birch Bayh, (D-ind.), would have removed the
authority of the Pipeline from the Interior Department:
The Mondale-Bayh amendment authorized a 
National Academy of Sciences study of 
alternative routes, to be followed by 
a Congressional determination of which 
was preferable. The State Department 
was directed to start discussions 
immediately with the Canadians about 
a trans-Canada pipeline.
This amendment was supported by the environmental coalition
as a type of "last ditch" effort against the pipeline.
On Friday, July 13, the Senate defeated the Mondale-
47Richard Corrigan and Claude Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby 
Uses Its Political Muscle to Bypass Environmental Law,"
National Journal 5 (August 11, 1973); 1175.
48Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 269.
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49Bayh amendment by a vote of 61 to 29. On July 17, the 
Senate voted on the NEPA exclusion. The vote was a 49 - 49 
tie. Vice-President Agnew, by tradition, cast the tie-breaking
vote, which was in favor of the amendment. Following the
50NEPA vote the Senate passed the bill 77 to 20.
While this was occuring in the Senate, the House was 
working on a similar measure. After a series of close votes,
the House Interior Committee approved language exempting
51the pipeline from the NEPA by a 19 to 17 vote. Surprisingly,
the House floor debate went smoothly, due in part to heavy
lobbying by the oil companies and Alyeska. The vote, on
52August 21, was 3 56 to 60. One angry midwestern legislator
said, "It was a shameful afternoon. The whole House stank
of oil. There hasn't been anything like this since the days
53when the railroads bought legislators."
By the time the summer recess was over and the House- 
Senate conference committee met to resolve the differences 
between the two bills, war had broken out in the Middle 
East, and OPEC had declared an embargo on all oil shipments 
to the United States. The conference committee was forced 
to act quickly. The House of Representatives passed the
4 9Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 270.
50Corrigan and Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby Uses Its 
Policical Muscle," p. 1176.
51T,Ibid.
52Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 275.
53Corrigan and Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby Uses Its 
Political Muscle," p. 1172.
Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 on November 
12, by a vote of 361 to 14. The next day the Senate passed 
it by a margin of 80 to 5. President Nixon sighed the bill 
into law on November 16, 19 73.
Five years after the initial discovery of the huge oil 
deposit, a pipeline to transport the oil had finally been 
authorized. Work began in early 1974, and on July 20, 1977, 
oil began flowing through the pipeline. By 1980, it was 
producing 1.9 million barrels a day.
CHAPTER THREE
. The Alaskan lands controversy was a significant environ­
mental issue for many of the same reasons that distinguished 
the Alaskan pipeline issue. Again, a vast amount of 
ecologically fragile land was at stake, and once more the 
lines were clearly drawn between developer and conservationist 
the former seeking maximum exploitation of the state’s 
resources, and the latter fighting for increased federal 
protection of all wilderness areas involved. An Interior 
Department specialist on Alaskan affairs said part of the 
controversy could be stated simply, "Very high scenic 
value, very high mineral value— classic war."l
In order to understand the background of this issue 
it is necessary to recall the Native Alaskan Claims Settlement 
Act of 1971. (See chapter two) A key provision of this 
settlement is section 17 (d) (2), which states in part that
the Secretary of Interior:
Is directed to withdraw from all forms of 
appropriation under the public land laws, 
including the mining and mineral leasing laws 
and from selections under the Alaska Statehood 
Act, and from selection by Regional Corporations 
(the Natives) ... up to, but not to exceed, 
eighty million acres of unreserved public 
lands in the State of Alaska, including 
previously classified lands, which the 
Secretary deems are suitable for addition 
to or creation as units of the National 
Park, Forest, Wildlife, Refuge, and Wild
Ijames R. Wagner, "The Alaska Lands Issue: Our Last 
Frontier," Congressional Quarterly 35 (July 30, 1977): 
p. 1587.
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and Scenic River Systems.
Under Section (d) (2) and a previous subsection, (d) (1),
120 million acres were withdrawn. The Act also directed 
the.Secretary to recommend to Congress within two years 
how these lands should be designated. Within five years 
of the Secretary's designations, Congress was to establish
3
the areas officially and set their boundaries. If
legislation was not passed by December 18, 197 8, all
protection for these lands would come to an end.
In December 1973 Rodgers C. Morton recommended
establishing 83 million acres of Alaska, in 23 areas, as
additions to the four systems of protection. (National
Parks, National Wildlife Refuges, National Forests, and
4
National Wild and Scenic Rivers.) No immediate action was 
taken on his recommendations. Between 1973 and 1976 several 
bills were introduced concerning the withdrawn land, but 
none of them ever reached the hearing stage.
Nineteen seventy-seven, however, proved to be an impor­
tant year for this issue. With the deadline approaching, 
several pieces of legislation were introduced. Among them 
was H.R. 39, sponsored by Rep. Morris K. Udall. (D-AZ) This 
bill was supported by the Alaska Coalition, the seventeen
2
U.S., Congress, Senate, Conference Report on Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act, S . Report 92-581, 92nd. Congress,
1st. session, 1971, Senate Miscellaneous Reports on 
Public Bills, 1:25.
3
Wagner, "The Alaska Lands Issue," p. 1588.
4Ibid.
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national and Alaskan conservation groups working on the
issue, because it was the most restrictive of development.
Described as an ambitious plan, it encompassed 115 million
acres, which were to be placed under the protection of the
traditional four systems. Additionally, all the areas were
to be -esignated as wilderness, making them components of
the National Wilderness Preservation System. Wilderness
classification amounts to an overlay on the other Systems,
and restricts logging, mining, and extraction of oil and 
5
gas. Similar legislation was introduced in the Senate by 
Henry Jackson, (D-WA), as S-50 0. This was later modified 
and reintroduced by the late Lee Metcalf, (D-MT), as S-1500 
and included about one million additional acres.
Contraposed to this was S-178 7, introduced by Alaskan 
Senator Ted Steyens on June 30, 1977. This bill, drafted 
by Stevens, Alaskan Representative Don Young, and Alaskan 
Governor Jay Hammond, was supported by the State and interested 
pro-development corporations. It would have added less than 
25 million acres to the four systems, with none classified 
as wilderness. It would also have placed 57 million acres 
into a new (fifth) category, called "Federal Cooperative 
Lands." These lands would be managed by existing.federal 
agencies, but in conjunction with lands managed by state 
and private landowners. All these lands would still be open
5Ann Pelham, "Meeds Loses m  Test Vote on His Alaska 
Lands Plan," Congressional Quarterly 36 (January 21, 1978): 
p. 127.
/■
Wagner, "The Alaskan Lands Issue," p. 1589.
to development.
Conservationists immediately voiced the concern about 
the so-called "fifth category." But Stevens saw it as a 
way to postpone decisions about what to do with at least 
some of the disputed lands. "I know of no other state 
where we have had such a wholesale attack on its lands,"
Stevens said at a press conference on June 30th. "We 
would have been better off with seperate bills for each 
parcel of land."7
Standing somewhere between these two plans was the 
Carter Administration proposal. Presented on September 15, 
it took the form of amendments to H.R. 39. The Administration 
recommended protection for 91.7 5 million acres, approximately 
twenty percent less than called for by H.R. 39, and directed 
much less land to be designated wilderness. Calling the 
plan, "the highest environmental priority of the Administration 
Secretary Cecil D. Andrus said, "If we err in this decision 
and exclude some previous and delicate areas from the four 
systems, these areas are lost forever... But if we err by 
conserving too much, this can always be changed in the future."
In general, conservation groups were pleased with the 
proposal. Cathy Smith, The Alaska Coalition's Washington 
coordinator said of the Administration's plans, "We are
^"The Alaskan Lands Issue: Our Last Frontier,"
1977 Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1977), p. 673.
8James R. Wagner, "Administration Submits Proposals 
to Protect Alaskan Wilderness," Congressional Quarterly 35 
(September 24, 1977): p. 2003.
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in total agreement with them on so many issues that they
9
have outlined." The only exception was the lack of move­
ment towards wilderness protection. They objected to the 
fact that the Alaska Peninsula and the lower Naotak River 
were excluded from (d) (2) protection.
The House of Representatives was the first to act. A 
special subcommittee of the Interior and Insular Affairs 
Committee, called the Subcommittee on General Oversight and 
Alaska Lands, was established to work on legislation. The 
subcommittee began hearings during April 1977, in Washington 
D.C. They then moved on to Chicago, Denver, Atlanta, and 
Seattle. During July and August hearings were held in 
Alaska. In total, seventeen formal hearings and twenty-two 
meetings were held, with over two thousand witnesses 
testifying.^
On October 17, the subcommittee, under its chairman 
John Seiberling, (D-Ohio) began mark-up of. the bill. The 
subcommittee staff ordered an- unnumbered draft substitute
bill as a possible vehicle for mark-up. Udall said the
12draft had his, "approval as a new starting point." On 
November 3, the subcommittee voted to accept the now twice 
revised version of H.R. 39 as the mark-up vehicle. The 
total acreage to be protected now stood at 102 million,
9
Wagner, "Administration Submits Proposals," p. 2004.
10T. ..Ibid.
■^Wagner, "The Alaska Lands Issue," p. 1590.
12197 7 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p . 673.
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81 million of which was to be designated as wilderness.
However, further consideration was put off until early 1978
after Representative Lloyd Meeds, (D-WA) asked Seiberling
for.additional time so, "he could study the proposals and
13possibly write a new one."
On January 16, 197 8 Meeds made his plan public. He
proposed to put only 7 9 million acres into the four systems,
with only 10 million acres classified as wilderness.
Additionally,
Meeds proposed (his own) "fifth system" 
of 18.5 million additional acres called 
Alaska Natural Wildlands, which would 
receive further study by government and 
private interests to identify mineral, 
oil and other resources. They are,
"lands we don't know enough about," 
that would be protected while studies 
continue, he said.
15One Udall aide called Meeds' action, "divisive as hell,"
because it was likely to destroy Democratic harmony on the
issue. Both the Carter Administration and conservation
groups opposed the Meed amendment, or any other type of
postponment. "Developers love delay," said Steve Young
of the National Audubon Society. "They can lobby indefinitely,
chipping away at their opponents, while conservation groups
16with limited resources must concentrate their efforts."
On January 18, 1978 the subcommittee voted on whether
13Ann Pelham, "New Proposal Muddies Alaska Lands Debate," 
Congressional Quarterly 36 (January 14, 1978): p. 66.
14Pelham, "Meeds Loses m  Test Vote," p. 12.
15Pelham, "New Proposal Muddies Alaska Lands Debate," p. 66.
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to use Meeds' substitute as the vehicle for mark-up, or
to stay with H.R. 39. The vote was 10 to 7 for H.R. 39,
17in favor of the conservationist position. This would
prove to be a very significant vote for conservationists
because it meant that their opponents had to put their
alternative proposals up as amendments to H.R. 39 during
the rest of the subcommittee mark-up. "The pro-development
forces were required to assemble a majority on every amend-
18ment they proposed."
When asked why he involved himself so heavily in the
debate and spent weeks working on his proposal, Meeds,
(who planned to retire at the end of the year) replied,
"That's a good question...! felt that Cthe committee) was
unduly restricting the State of Alaska and its development,
and unduly restricting the Natives and also development of
19other resource values." Even after defeat, however, Meeds 
vowed to carry his fight to the House floor.
H.R. 3 9 was subjected to fourteen days of mark-up during 
January and February. On February 7, the bill was reported 
to the full Interior Committee. The total amount of land 
to be protected now stood at 9 8 million acres, although no 
decision was reached on how much would be designated wilder­
ness. The subcommittee prefered to let that decision be
17Pelham, "Meeds Loses in Test Vote," p. 127.
18Donald J. Patterson, "Environmental Groups and The 
Alaska (D) (_2) Lands," (Senior Honors Thesis, College of
William and Mary, 1979), p. 18.
19Pelham, "Meeds Loses m  Test Vote," p. 127.
made by the entire committee.
As promised, Meeds tried to substitute his bill for the
one reported by the subcommittee. The 20 to 24 vote against
Meeds was another crucial victory for conservationists.
Lobbyists for oil and gas interests, mining companies, and
labor groups had rallied behind the proposal; a lobbying
combination that even the Carter Administration found
difficult to counter.^ At one point in the debate Interior
Chairman Udall sought to clear up an argument used by Meed's
supporters that logging jobs would be lost if large areas
were designated as wilderness:
"A lot of my friends are being misled,"
Udall told the Committee. "They're 
being lobbied by timber companies, ' 
lobbied by labor unions...I don't 
want to see them join the wrecking 
crew on this. The people who don't 
want this bill are using the labor
unions to act as a battering ram for
them."21
The Interior Committee reported the bill March 21 by
a 32 to 13 vote. However, this required the sacrifice of the
2.4 million acre Misty Fjords area in the Tongass National 
Forest, excluding it from the proposed wilderness designation. 
Thus mining, logging, and oil and gas exploration would no 
longer be barred from that area. "These deletions will 
assure that not a timber-related job will be lost in south­
eastern Alaska as a result of this legislation," said
2 nAnn Pelham, "Conservationists Win Alaska Wilderness 
Key Vote," Congressional Quarterly 36 (March 11, 1978): p. 616
2-1-Ibid.
22ibid.
45
committee member Bob Echart, (D-TX)^3 still, the substance 
of the bill was intact. "In most of the critical areas we 
have held strong," said Cathy Smith, of the Alaska Coalition.24 
. After passing through the Merchant Marine Committee, 
where proposed amendments to the provisions on wildlife 
refuges were added, it was up to the House Rules Committee 
to grant a rule before H.R. 3 9 could reach the floor.
Meeds, who was also a member of the Rules Committee, tried 
to prevent a floor vote because, "It would be unwarranted 
to make House members vote on a tough labor versus conser­
vation issue when there is absolutely no chance, at this 
time, of it going to the Senate F l o o r . "25 The Rules 
Committee disagreed, however, and granted an open rule 
on May 16, after two weeks of debate and delay.
There were five key votes on H.R. 39 after it reached 
the House floor, all of which were won by the conservationists 
and their supporters. This included an amendment by Young 
to delete. 4.5 million acres of area from proposed parks 
and refuges, (defeated 251-141), and an amendment sponsored 
by Meeds to cut in half the amount of acerage designated 
wilderness, (defeated 240-119). The only victory for the 
pro-development side was an amendment by Jim Santini, (D-Nev.) 
which instructed the Secretary Of Interior to continue
23peiham, "Conservationists Win Alaska Wilderness 
Key VotO," p. 616.
^Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska 
(D) (2) Lands," p. 18.
25^nn Pelham, "Alaska Wilderness Bill Heads for House 
Floor," Congressional Quarterly 36 (May 6, 1978) p. 1125.
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mineral assessments on all public lands in Alaska and required 
the President to submit to Congress by October 1, 1981, 
recommendations regarding mineral development on these lands, 
(passed 157-150). The final vote on H.R. 39 was 277 to 31,
2 g
a ratio of almost nine-to-one in favor of the bill.
The Senate undertook consideration of the Alaska lands
issue on June 6. It was a difficult procedure, hampered by
many delays. The problem was two-fold. At this time there
was a considerable amount of pending legislation to which
the Democratic leadership had given a higher priority than
the Alaska lands bill. (Especially important was the issue
of natural gas deregulation which was before Senator Henry
Jackson's Energy and Natural Resources Committee, the same
27committee which would deal with the lands issue.)
Additionally, Alaska's two Senators, Mike Gravel and
Ted Stevens, were both opposed to the conservationists,
or any type of environmentally strict legislation. During
the week of July 10, Gravel invoked a little known rule which
forced the Senate committee to meet early in the morning,
with poor attendance the result and little work being accom- 
2 8plished. Later that week Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd. 
(D-W. VA) invoked another obscure parliamentary rule which
2 6Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska 
(D) (2) Lands," p. 19.
27
Ann Pelham, "Alaska Lands Bill Moving Slowly Through 
Senate Panel," Congressional Quarterly 36 (July 22, 1978): 
p. 1876-1877.
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allowed the Senate to bypass Gravel’s obstacle. However 
Gravel still threatened to filibuster the bill if it were 
ever to reach the senate floor.
Although his threat to filibuster remained, Senator 
Gravel did not employ any further overt delaying tactics the 
rest of the year. Contrary to this was Senator Stevens, 
who also threatened a filibuster and did play a major delaying 
role in the Senate’s consideration of the legislation. This 
was done for several reasons. The longer the mark-up procedure 
took, the more concessions he could achieve for the pro-develop­
ment position. Additionally, if mark-up was not completed 
until the end of the session there would be no time for a 
House-Senate conference. The House would be forced to choose 
between the pro-development Senate bill or no bill at all.2^
To this end Stevens sat in on all Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee mark-up sessions and won many concessions, 
even though he was not a member of the committee. Apparently 
members of the committee gave into him more that they might 
have otherwise in an attempt to get the bill passed and 
avoid a filibuster.
With the end of the session approaching, the 
threat of a filibuster became more effective.
It was felt by some that a one-man filibuster 
by Gravel could be broken, and that if 
Stevens (accepted) the Energy Committee's 
bill, Congress could pass Alaska lands legis­
lation that year.30
^ A n n  Pelham, "Lengthly Mark-up Increases Odds Against 
Enactment of Alaska Lands Bill," Congressional Quarterly 
36 (September 9, 1978): p. 2440.
3 0^Patterson, "Environmental Groups and The Alaska (D) (2)
Lands," p. 20.
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The concessions made to Stevens upset many conser­
vationists. Chuck Cluser of the Sierra Club stated that 
the Alaska Coalition was very disappointed in what the 
energy committee had done. "We're not about to be black­
mailed with a weak bill just because there isn't enough 
31time." Morris Udall echoed this feeling when he said,
"There are a dozen things in there (the Senate bill) now
32that make it unacceptable."
After weeks of compromising, and over forty mark-up
sessions, the committee reported the bill on October 5.
There were now numerous differences between the Senate and
House versions. Stevens fought against anything that
resembled H.R. 39, while conservationists were represented
by Committee member John A. Durkin, (D-N.H.). Senator
Jackson, the chairman, generally took a position somewhat
between the two.
The same lobbyists for mineral, lumber, 
oil and gas interests, and conservation 
organizations, who had followed the House 
bill through months of mark-up spent hours 
in the energy committee hearing room, 
waiting for meetings to begin and watching 
the very slow process.^
The strategy for the conservationists and other supporters
of H.R. 39 now was to have Udall and other House leaders
meet with Senate leaders and find a compromise on the issue
31Pelham, "Lengthly Mark-Up Increases Odds," p. 2440.
32 Ibid.
33Ann Pelham, "Alaska Lands Bill Reported by Senate 
Committee, But Action This Year Uncertain," Congressional 
Quarterly 36 (October 7, 1978): p. 2768.
before the bill went to the Senate floor. "Then the 
compromise could be offered as an amendment to the Senate 
committee bill. If the compromise was accepted then it 
could be returned to the House for quick action,"34 and 
sent to the President for his signature. These attempts 
were done with little enthusiasm however, as Senator Gravel 
still claimed he would filibuster. Also, Senator Byrd said 
he would not bring the bill before the full Senate unless 
there was a time limit on debate, which Gravel could also 
prevent, because of the backlog of other bills which needed
consideration.35
The situation changed dramatically on October 12, when 
Gravel said in a letter to Senators Stevens and Byrd that he 
would no longer block the bill. He claimed he changed his 
mind because the Citizens for the Management of Alaskan 
Lands (the coalition of industry groups opposed to the bill) 
The Alaska Lands Steering Council (a group sponsored by the 
Alaska state legislature), and other Alaskan politicians 
had convinced him that, "We should attempt compromise for 
a bill this year.
According to a Congressional Quarterly article dated 
October 21st, Gravel's announcement that he was dropping his 
filibuster plans hit the negotiations, "like a shot of
34pelham, "Alaska Lands Bill Reported," p. 2767.
35ibid.
3^Ann Pelham, "Administration Expected to Move to 
Preserve Alaska Wilderness Areas," Congressional Quarterly 
36 (October 21, 1978): p. 3100.
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adrenalin."
Secretary of Interior Andrus cut short a 
western trip. Key House and Senate leaders 
holed up with him in a room under the front 
eves of the Capitol. The band of committee 
aides, Interior officials, lobbyists and 
others who had followed the legislation for 
more than a year and a half camped outside 
the closed meeting.3 7
After a day and a half of closed meetings, lasting over
twenty hours, the conference members were close to reaching a
decision. Congressional Quarterly reports that approximately
96 million acres would have been put into the four systems
with a total of 50 million acres of new and old four systems
3 8land to be designated wilderness.
Yet toward the end of the session Gravel issued one
additional demand. He insisted on a guarantee that specific
rights-of-way be assigned for pipelines, railroads, highways
and other types of transportation across federal conservation
areas and other state-owned lands. Morris Udall and John
Seiberling, who had already agreed to many changes which
weakened the bill, could not accept this change. The meeting
broke up on October 14, at 11:00 am. Stevens told those
39waiting outside, "Its all over. No bill." There was to 
be no Alaska Lands bill from the 95th Congress. The next 
day Senator John Durkin said, "The compromise floundered on
37Pelham, "Administration Expected to Move," p. 3100.
38Laura B. Weiss, "Alaskans Seek Injunction to Stop 
Carter Move to Protect Federal Lands," Congressional 
Quarterly 36 (November 4, 1978): p. 3228.
39Pelham, "Administration Expected to Move," p. 3101.
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two words, and those two words are, 'Mike Gravel.'"
The failure of Congress to reach a decision made 
executive action necessary. In July of that year Secretary 
Andrus had warned that the administration would take action
of its own if Congress was unable. (See table one for pos­
sible sources of authority.) On September 15, speaking 
before the Nature Conservancy, he renewed this pledge:
On my recent float trip with President 
Carter we discussed Alaska, and he made 
it absolutely clear that he stands behind 
whatever measures we must take to protect 
those Alaskan wildlands... The stakes in 
Alaska are too high for hesitation.
The loss to the nation would be too 
great. If the Congress fails’to a c t ^
this year, the President and I will.
On November 16, using the'Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976, he closed 110 million acres of land to commercial
development for a three year period.
On December 1, using the Antiquities Act of 1906,
President Carter gave the Alaska lands additional protection.
He created seventeen new national monuments, giving permanent
protection to 55 million acres of federal wilderness in the
state. "Risks of immediate damage to magnificent areas make
it imperative to protect all the lands and preserve for
Congress an unhampered opportunity to act on its own in the
40Pelham, "Administration Expected to Move," p. 3100.
41U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of Interior Andrus 
as he addresses the Nature Conservancy, September 14, inserted 
by Senator Stevens of Alaska, 95th Congress, Second Session, 
September 18, 1978, Congressional Record, 124: S15287 - 
15289.
Table 1
Possible Sources of Authority for Action 
by Carter Administration
1. Federal Land Policy and Management Act— also known as the 
Bureau of Land Management "organic act", this law set out general 
policy for management of the more than 470 million acres of fede­
ral land in the agency's jurisdiction. Under this law, the Inter­
ior Secretary could have earmarked for wilderness study millions 
of federally owned acres in Alaska. While being studied, this 
land would have to be managed in a way that would not destroy 
existing wilderness features. Secretary of Interior Andrus used 
this law to protect the (d) (2) land on November 16, 19 78.
2. Antiquities Act of 1906--this law gives the President 
authority to use executive orders to create national monuments. 
Such a designation gives them approximately the same protection 
as is given to areas classified as national parks. Precedent 
exists for using this act to protect large areas of Alaska.
For instance, Glacier Bay, a wilderness sand beach along the 
Pacific Coast, is a national monument as is Katmai, 2.7 million 
acres in the southern part of the state. President Carter used 
the Antiquities Act to protect federal land in Alaska on Dec­
ember 2, 19 78.
3. Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956--this act gave the Secretary 
of the Interior authority to take steps needed to conserve and 
develop fisheries and wildlife resources, including the estab­
lishment of refuges for fish and wildlife. To date, this has 
not been utilized to protect any Alaskan land.
Source: Ann Pelham, "Alaska Lands Bill Moving Slowly Through 
Senate Panel," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 
July 22, 1978, p. 1877.
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next year,"42 sai^ Carter. A spokesman for the Alaska 
Coalition said Carter had exceeded the efforts of even 
Theodore Roosevelt and become, "The greatest conservation 
President of all t i m e . " 4 ^
Activities of the 96th Congress paralleled those of 
the 9 5th in many ways. In the House of Representatives, the 
initial movement seemed to be against the conservationists.
The House Interior Committee, during mark-up on February 28, 
1979, adopted a substitute bill in place of H.R. 39 by 
a 23 to 20 vote. Offered by Jerry Huckaby, (D-LA) the sub­
stitute was identical to the compromise bill killed in the 
Senate a year before by Mike Gravel. Udall attributed the 
defeat to a change in the committee membership. A Republican 
delegate from the Virgin Islands took a seat held by a 
Democrat in the previous session, and voted for the sub­
stitute. It set aside nearly 98 million acres in conservation 
areas, and designated approximately 51 million acres as 
wilderness.
Developers also won a vote in the Merchant Marine 
Committee on April 9. Although the committee voted on an 
amendment by Representative Breaux, (D-LA) to set aside 127 
million acres as conservation units, 85 million acres were 
designated as refuge, a classification which permitted 
commercial development.
42^nn Pelham, "Carter Sets Aside 56 Million Acres in 
Alaska," Congressional Quarterly 36 ( December 2, 1978): 
p. 3389.
43Ibid.
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"being stampeded by the oil and gas interests." Andrus quoted
A
Carter as saying, "This has made my day."
On the other side of capitol hill, the Senate Energy 
Committee used S. 9, a bill identical to the one it reported 
in 1978, as the basis of its 1979 proceedings. Alaska's 
senators Gravel and Stevens both played important roles in 
the Senate's activities— Stevens as a member of the Energy 
Committee and Gravel as a non-member, invited to participate 
by Chairman Henry Jackson. Both were anxious to get a 
pro-development bill reported that year. The alternative 
was to wait until 19 80, an election year, in which they 
felt it would be difficult to get senators to vote in their 
favor. Another key member of the committee was Paul Tsongas, 
(D-Mass.) who represented the conservationists' position 
throughout the deliberation.
The committee took steps to avoid the lengthly and 
counterproductive mark-up fights which occurred in 1978. 
Informal meetings were held between Gravel, Stevens, and 
Tsongas, where many controversial issues were negotiated 
and agreed upon. The products of these sessions were then 
brought to the full committee for formal ratification.
"An awful lot is happening behind the scenes to take un­
acceptable amendments and make them acceptable," said 
Rich Arenberg, a Tsongas aide, referring to the negotiations.47
The mark-up sessions took most of the month of October.
^"House Passes Bill, But Senate Stymied," p. 665. 
47Ibid., p. 672.
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Gravel, generally unsuccessful in getting his amendments
accepted by the committee, threatened again to filibuster
any bill he did not like. Senator Stevens, however, was
anxious for a bill to be passed. He claimed that failure
to do so in 1978, "had a devastating effect on the state's
economy." Investors stayed away because of uncertainty,
unemployment was up, and growth in per capita income
was less in Alaska than in the rest of the country. Stevens
at first sought a time limit to restrict debate on the
bill, but abandoned his efforts when Gravel made clear his
intention to filibuster anything he considered a "bad bill."
The problem was resolved at the end of October after
many long mark-up sessions. "A blue-ribbon advisory panel
of Alaska officials and residents appointed by Governor
Hammond decided the Senate bill was livable, and urged the
48two warring Senators to work together for its passage."
The panel decided that the committee bill, 
even though it doesn't contain what they 
want, is the high water-mark on what they 
can expect on Alaska lands legislation 
this year, said Bob Miller, a spokesman ^  
from the Alaska state office in Washington.
Additionally, the panel advised the two Senators to try and
kill the bill of any significant changes (pro-environment)
were made on the floor or during the conference.
The committee, by a vote of 17 to 1, ordered reported
its version of H.R. 39 (S9) on October 30. It set aside
48 "House Passes Bill, But Senate Stymied," p. 677.
49 Ibid., p. 674.
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102 million acres of land, 39.2 million of .which were to be 
designated wilderness. Gravel agreed not to filibuster 
and Stevens began working for a time agreement on floor 
action. However, all progress stopped on November 15, after 
Tsongas introduced a substitute bill which would have set 
aside 125 million acres with over 80 million of them desig­
nated wilderness. Emergency negotiations between Tsongas 
and Stevens failed. Stevens broke off his attempts to bring 
the bill up for immediate consideration for fear that the 
full Senate would accept the substitute once it was on the 
floor. This would leave the pro-development forces with 
little to negotiate in a House-Senate conference. Stevens' 
withdrawal ended the chance of passing an Alaskan lands bill 
during the first session of the 96th Congress.
On February 7, 1980, the pro-development forces 
scored a victory when Senators Stevens and Gravel were 
able to get the Senate to agree by voice vote to delay floor 
action on the Alaskan lands legislation until after the 
July 4th recess. The agreement provided for twenty hours of 
debate and the introduction of a total of fourteen amendments; 
this in exchange for Gravel's agreement not to filibuster.
At a press conference after the vote, the two senators 
displayed their enthusiasm. They said that if they had not 
entered into the agreement, the bill would have come up 
right after the February 11-15 recess. "We wouldn't have 
been able to stop it (if it had been called up) now," Gravel 
said. He continued, "Never in my wildest dreams did I think 
we could hold out until late summer or fall." Stevens agreed,
57
50"I thought the longest we could hold out was May."
The Senators now believed that they could force more com­
promises from the environmentalists by waiting until 
close to the end of the session when most Senators would 
be pressed for time.
Environmentalists and the administration were generally
caught off guard by the agreement. Charles Clusen, chairman
of the Alaska Coalition, complained that the action was,
"reminiscent of the efforts made by the Alaskan Senators in
1978 to force debate of the issue into the final closing
51hours of the session."
Secretary Andrus reacted on February 11 by shifting 
the momentum back to the conservationists. He withdrew an 
additional 4 0 million acres of land from development, bringing 
the total to 96 million acres that had been put off limits 
to developers for at least twenty years. The remaining 14 
million acres of the original 110 million which Carter with­
drew in 1978 were put under review, keeping alive the possibility 
that they could eventually be withdrawn also. Andrus pointed 
out that the withdrawals could be rescinded by passage of an 
Alaskan lands bill, and that his actions were designed as a 
type of insurance policy to prevent the type of, "deliberate 
obstructionism," which killed a similar bill in 1978. "The 
Senators are of the position that there will not be any 
bill this year. That is exactly why I decided to take the
50Kathy Koch, "Alaska Lands Development Leave No Clear 
Winners," Congressional Quarterly 38 (February 16, 1980): p. 396.
^Ibid. , p. 397.
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52withdrawal action."
It was early August before the Senate began deliberation
anew. The Senate Energy Committee worked for two weeks in
closed-door sessions developing its less restrictive version
of H.R. 39. On August 19, the full Senate adopted a compromise
53version of this bill by a vote of 7 8 to 14. The measure
set aside only 104.3 million acres of land into the different
conservation units, and imposed various degrees of restrictions
on oil, mineral, and timber development. It passed despite
the strong objections of Senator Gravel, who was to lose his
bid for re-election later that month.r It also completed the
transfer of lands mandated by the Alaska Statehood Act and
delivered approximately 44 million acres of land due to the
native Indians under the Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.
Senator Stevens commented that, "It is the best that can be
done. It gives everyone eighty percent of what they were 
54after.
Initial House reaction was skeptical, and conservation 
leaders vowed to work and strengthen the Senate bill. House 
members wrote Udall demanding that the Senate versions be 
brought more in line with the House bill. The 19 80 elections, 
however, played a part in changing many individuals' attitudes. 
Udall said, "Political realities now dictate that we act
52Koch, "Alaska Lands Development," p. 397.
53 "Key Votes," Congressional Quarterly 38 {.December 27, 
1980; p. 3663.
54 "All We Wanted And Less," Los Angeles Times, editorial, 
(November 13, 1981); p. 8.
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promptly on the Senate passed bill. We must accept the fact 
that Reagan is with us for four y e a r s . F r o m  the conser­
vationists' viewpoint, this was a wisle decision. The incoming 
Republican majority in the Senate would most likely be more 
sympathetic toward the pro-development position, and Ronald 
Reagan had already stated his displeasure with the Senate 
measure, calling it too restrictive.
On November 12, the House therefore approved the bill, 
with little debate, by a rather undramatic voice vote. After 
the vote Udall told Alaska Coalition members gathered outside 
the House chambers that, "The first installment has been made. 
It is a beginning."56 Coalition members agreed but added that 
they would fight for refinements in the future. Representative 
Seiberling commented that the measure, "Represents about 
eighty-five percent of what we had hoped to achieve when we 
passed the House bill.1 ^
President Carter announced that he was pleased, and 
called the decision a historic event in the nation's history.
He signed the measure into law on December 2, 1980. Thus, 
after years of contention and debate, twenty-eight percent 
of the total land area in Alaska--encompassing wild rivers, 
tundra, mountain ranges, seacoasts, forests, and wildlife 
refuges— was guaranteed to be safe from development and
^Kathy Koch, "House Clears the Senate's Alaska Lands 
Bill," Congressional Quarterly 38 (November 15, 1980): p. 3377.
56Ibid.
S^Ibid.t p. 337 8.
60
exploration. Ironically the threat of losing more under a 
Republican administration forced environmentalists to accept 
what properly should be regarded as a historic conservation 
victory. It was one of the largest and most intensely 
lobbied battles in Congressional history.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Alaska Public Interest Cohlition, which fought 
against the pipeline, and the Alaska Coalition, which 
worked for the Alaska lands bill, are both excellent 
examples of "Public Interest" coalitions which actively 
sought to influence public policy. The failure of the 
former when compared with the success of the latter 
provides a unique way of evaluating the effectiveness of 
certain strategies and tactics of influence. The purpose 
of this chapter, then, will be to compare the two coalitions 
both the circumstances surrounding their formation and their 
organizational structure, and the various strategies and 
tactics of influence they employed.
From its inception, billed by its sponsors as the most 
expensive construction project ever undertaken by private 
industry, the trans-Alaskan pipeline symbolized the con­
flict between land development and preservation of natural 
resources. Tom Brown, working with the Sierra Club in 19 70, 
stated that,
Never before have conservationists had a 
better opportunity to rescue nature from 
the mindless onslaught of technology. Nor 
could the battleground be more crucial 
than Alaska...If the nation's conserva­
tionists have the staying power, they 
stand a better chance of keeping Alaska 
from repeating the folly of the rest of 
the nation.1
^Tom Brown, Oil On Ice (San Francisco: The Sierra Club) 
p. 130-131.
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The "staying power" of the environmentalist movement 
in this instance took the form of the Alaska Public 
Interest Coalition. This organization, composed of loosely 
affiliated environmental groups, facilitated cooperation 
between all those who opposed the construction of the 
Alaska pipeline.
By far the most important organizations in the coalition 
were the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, the Friends of 
the Earth, and the Center for Law and Social Policy, (a law 
firm which represented the coalition's interests in court), 
the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, the Izaak Walton 
League of America, Trout Unlimited of Denver Colorado, Zero 
Population Growth of Los Angeles, and the American Rivers 
Council.^
The Alaskan lands issue symbolized much of the same type 
of controversy. Conservationists, development interests, 
Carter Administration officials, members of Congress, Alaskan 
officials, and lobbyists for diverse organizations all 
highlight the importance of the issue. This time the environ­
mentalist movement was represented by the Alaska Coalition, 
an organization of national and Alaskan groups. "I think 
there is a real feeling that this is a most important high- 
priority issue for all conservation groups," said Cathy 
Smith, the coalition's Washington D.C. coordinator. "The
2"Congress Completes Action on Alaskan Pipeline 
Bill," 1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, (Washington 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1973), p. 605.
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state began selecting land in 1958, the natives got second 
choice, and the national interest is coming last."3
Established in late 1976, the Alaska Coalition (here­
after called the lands coalition) drew many of its members 
from the Alaska Public Interest Coalition (hereafter called 
the pipeline coalition). Groups like the Wilderness Society, 
the Sierra Cliiib, and the National Audubon Society were 
reunited. Eventually the coalition's ranks were swelled to 
include such organizations as the United Auto Workers, the 
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, and the National 
Council of Senior Citizens, and numerpus state and local groups.
Recalling Berry's description of the three types of
coalitions in which public interest groups are involved
(dependent, participatory, and independent) it appears that
both the pipeline coalition and the lands coalition can be
identified as participatory coalitions. Brock Evans of the
Sierra Club explained that the pipeline coalition was not/
an official, incorporated organization.
All these groups just got together infor­
mally to work on the pipeline issue. No 
money was set aside for the coalition.
Expenses came out of the individual 
budgets of the members.4
The temporary nature of the coalition should also be noted.
After their final defeat in 1973, the pipeline coalition
was disbanded with no immediate plans for the future. Although
the lands coalition did have its own staff and possess a specific
3James R. Wagner, "The Alaska Lands Issue: Our Last 
Frontier," Congressional Quarterly 35 (July 30, 1977): p. 1588.
4"Congressional Quarterly Lobby Report," Congressional 
Quarterly 32 (July 27, 1974): p. 1950.
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identity, it too was organized around one specific issue, and 
once that issue was resolved, the coalition disbanded.
The reason for the pipeline coalition's formation was
not.too complicated. The primary goal, which was to prevent
construction of the pipeline and protect the wilderness in
Alaska from exploitation, is best summarized by David Brower's
February 5, 1971 column in the New York Times:
Alaska has known boom and bust before.
How many new ghosts does the oil industry 
plan for Alaska? Exotic grasses, planted 
and advertised on graves hurriedly dug 
on the Great Land's tundra, do not 
rescue America's last great wilderness, 
or responsibly aid the people who have 
successfully inhabited this place for 
millenia, developing there the most 
enduring culture North America has 
known. Whose the quick profit, whose 
the deprivation ever after. . ..We are 
not obliged to use up wantonly what­
ever oil resources we stumble into 
simply because it is there, and 
because after half evaluated studies 
we imagine we know how to pipe it 
safely to market.
This compares with the reasons behind the formation of 
the lands coalition; again for the protection of federal 
wilderness areas in the 4 9th state. The statement, "Very 
high secnic value, very high mineral value--classic war," 
underscores the problems involved.
When the Alaskan issues first arose, the environmentalist 
movement had just recently concluded a successful three year 
battle to eliminate government funding for the SST, and 
had prevented construction of a jetport in the everglades of
^New York Times, editorial, February 25, 1971.
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southern Florida. However, the battle to defeat the pipeline 
and later the attempts to protect the Alaskan lands would 
prove to be much more difficult contests, against experienced 
opponents, and involving some complicated strategies and 
tactics. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to 
an analysis of the strategies and tactics which were em­
ployed.
As noted in chapter one, Jeffrey Berry described four 
"strategies of influence" available to public interest 
groups and their attempts to influence policy: Law,
embarrassment and confrontation, information, and constit­
uency influence and pressure. The pipeline coalition relied 
primarily on two of these strategies of influence— "law" 
and "information." Additionally, some of the tactics which 
Berry lists under "constituency influence and pressure" 
were occasionally utilized, but never in an organized manner. 
The strategy of "embarrassment and confrontation" was not 
employed because the coalition possessed enough influence 
and legitimacy to achieve access into the political process 
without relying on such overt attention-attracting tactics.
For the lands coalition the strategy of "law" was not 
an option because the decision was to be made entirely in 
Congress. And as with the pipeline coalition, "embarrassment 
and confrontation" was not considered because it is such 
an extreme action. Instead, the coalition relied primarily 
on the strategies of "information" and "constituency 
influence and pressure."
The following pages of this section will consider the
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strategy of "law" as employed by the pipeline coalition.
This will be followed by a comparison of the strategy 
"information" as it was utilized by both the pipeline 
coalition and the lands coalition. The chapter will end 
with a comparison of the way each coalition employed the 
strategy "constituency influence and pressure".
STRATEGY I - LAW
At first the strategy of legal confrontation proved 
quite useful for the pipeline coalition. Early in 197 0 
Secretary Hickel was ready to issue a construction permit 
to TAPS, allowing them to begin work on the 3 09 mile haul 
road necessary for construction of the pipeline itself.
This approval was based on a short, ten-page impact state­
ment which contained no environmental analysis, and which 
had been filed for the haul road only, and not the p i p e l i n e . 6 
On that basis the coalition brought suit in federal district 
court.
What was the purpose of taking the pipeline question 
to court? In chapter eleven of Interest Groups In American 
Society, Harmon Zeigler discusses interest group participation 
in the judicial process. He notes that sometimes litigation 
is used expressly as a delaying tactic, to allow the 
plantiff additional time to prepare for a conflict which 
will likely be resolved out of court. This was apparently 
true with regard to Wilderness Society vs. Hickel. Moorman's
£
Lynton K. Caldwell, Lynton R. Hayes and Isabel MacWhirter, 
Citizens and the Environment (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1976), p. 233.
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request simply for an injunction, coupled with a request for 
a fourteen day advance notice of intention to issue any 
permits, underscores the temporary nature of the request.
The ultimate resolution of this issue would occur elsewhere.
Additionally, the entrance of various Canadian interests 
into the process, allied as they were with the environmen­
talists, would also prove to be a significant factor when 
the decision-making location was moved to Capitol Hill. 
According to Donald Hall, the original group may gain 
greater access to decision makers, or the general public 
through,
Channels open to, or controlled by, new 
allies. In each of these cases, the group 
seeking cooperation with other groups will 
attempt to utilize the cooperative form of 
organization...to expand the original 
group's influence^
This idea is echoed by Byron C. Kennard, of the Conservation
Foundation, who said, "The most urgently important thing for
the environmental movement to do is to associate its priorities
with other communities of interest."^ The involvement of the
Canadian participants, first the conservationists, and later
on Canadian pipeline representatives, is an excellent example
of a "community of interest." One whose participation was
made possible by the legal delay tactics of the coalition.
For the most part, the coalition's strategy of litigation
n
Donald R. Hall, Cooperative Lobbying - The Power of 
Pressure (Tucson, AZ.: University of Arizona Press, 1969), p. 66
^James R. Wagner, "Environment Groups Shifts Tactics 
From Demonstrations to Politics, Local Action," National 
Journal 3 (July 24, 1971): p. 1563.
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can be termed successful. It had been almost four years 
since TAPS first proposed to build the 800 mile long pipe­
line. During that time the coalition had successfully 
fought the pipeline interests to a standstill in the courts. 
The issue was brought to the forefront of the public's 
attention, and they were now ready to prusue it in Congress. 
STRATEGY II - INFORMATION
Once the issue was in Congress, the pipeline coalition 
was forced to adopt other strategies. One very important 
strategy which they utilized was "information". This is 
the action of making your point of view public and presenting 
it before decision-makers (both officially and unofficially). 
Information also played an important part in the land 
coalition's efforts. A group which relies on this strategy, 
according to Berry, can employ such tactics as congressional 
testimony, personal lobbying, and releasing research results 
and internal publicity. The pipeline coalition concentrated 
especially on congressional testimony, with a lesser emphasis 
on lobbying. On the other hand, the lands coalition put 
major emphasis on their lobbying efforts, with relatively 
minor efforts directed towards testimony and no releasing 
of research results. This section begins first by comparing 
the use of congressional testimony.
The pipeline coalition at first welcomed congressional 
participation, because of anticipated bi-partisan support 
in both the House and Senate. As early as May 1972, a 
group of twenty-three Senators and more than eighty Rep­
resentatives were calling for further public hearings
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9concerning the Interior Department's final impact report.
Senate Majority Whip Robert P. Griffin sent a letter to
Morton urging serious consideration of the Canadian route
and- further hearings.
The only public hearings to date on the 
proposed pipeline were held by the Depart­
ment a year ago...They are clearly inadequate.
Since then the Canadian alternative has 
become more attractive, (and) several 
changes have been proposed in the Alaska 
pipeline.10
However, Zeigler and Peak believe that congressional
testimony is generally thought to be, "of doubtful value
in the communication of influence..."'^ In Berry's survey
of lobbying techniques, forty-two percent of the public
interest lobbyists surveyed felt that such testimony was,
12"not effective." He states that testifying before committees
is usually thought of as having simply symbolic value because,
"appearing at hearings helps to legitimize further efforts
13to influence legislation."
Although they were unsuccessful in getting further 
hearings on the environmental impact report, the coalition 
was able to testify in regard to other aspects of the
9
"Alaskan Oil: Legal Battle Promised on Pipeline," 
Congressional Quarterly 30 (May 20, 1972): p. 1130.
Ibid.
"^Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 139.
12
Jeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying for the People (Princeton 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 223.
13Ibid.
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pipeline. Testimony before Senator Jackson's Interior
Committee was especially heavy. The purpose here was to
marshal congressional support for legislation which would
defer approval of the pipeline, so that studies of the
trans-Canada route could be examined.
We have an excellent coalition of forces 
who are working very hard to try to con­
vince the Senate Interior Committee that 
this is no time to rush ahead with the 
right-of-way bill, but to wait for 
further information.14
This, the goal of George Alderson, legislative director of
the Friends of the Earth.
Yet, as might have been predicted, such testimony came 
to little avail. The bill that Jackson's Interior Committee 
reported out to the full Senate was a disappointment.
Not only did it recommend approval, but it stated that any 
further delays for additional studies would have little 
positive value. The only bright spot was that the publicity 
generated by such public discussion of the issues resulted 
in The New York Times, Washington Post, and Boston Globe 
printing editorials against the pipeline and in favor of 
an extended delay to study other proposals.*^
The tactic of congressional testimony was of relatively 
minor importance for the lands coalition's efforts, however 
they were able to use the hearings effectively and illustrate
14 "Alaska Pipeline: New Energy Environment Clash 
Looms," Congressional Quarterly 31 (March 31, 1973): 
p. 724.
15Donald J. Patterson, Jr. "Environmental Groups and 
The Alaska (D) (.2). Lands," (Senior Honors Thesis, College
of William and Mary, 1979), p. 44.
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the lands issue as a national one, concerning more than just 
Alaska and Alaskans. Udall and Seiberlings1s decision to 
hold hearings across the country dramatized that fact.
. The first major act of the coalition was to get
16members and supporters to turn out at these hearings.
Representatives from thirteen seperate organizations testified
1 7on behalf of a strong pro-environmentalist bill. Although 
this was not a crucial factor in the ultimate resolution 
of the issue, using the tactic of congressional testimony 
to establish the nation-wide concern for the lands issue was 
an important step in getting environmentally strict legis­
lation passed.
When comparing the efforts of the two coalitions it 
appears that the pipeline coalition relied on testimony 
as a means of making substantive progress towards their 
goal, while the lands coalition relied on it primarily 
as a symbolic tool to make a relatively small but effective 
point. This would seem to confirm the conclusions of 
both Milbrath and Berry who found that testimony was one 
of the least favored ways of achieving access into the 
decision making process. The pipeline coalition put a 
great deal of time and effort into a relatively unimportant
16Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska 
Lands," p. 44.
17U.S. House, "Inclusion of Alaska Lands m  Natural 
Park, Forest, Wildlife Refuge and Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Systems," Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Interior 
and Insular Affairs on H.R. 39, H.R. 1974, H.R. 2876, H . R. 
5565, 95th Congress, 1st session, 1977, Table of Contents, 
p. iii, iv, v.
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activity— possibly to the exclusion of other activities— and 
ended up with very little to show for it. The lands coaliton 
did not put much effort into the process— pursuing it for 
its.symbolic value alone— and was successful in the process. 
This was to set the pattern for both sides in their future 
endeavors.
Another tactic under the information strategy, which 
both coalitions relied on, was direct and personal lobbying. 
This tactic of influence is favored by a majority of lobbyists. 
According to Milbrath, eighty percent of the respondents
18said that they prefer direct methods over indirect methods.
He claims that Congressmen and their staffs also feel that
19individual presentations are important. Fifty-three percent
of the public interest group lobbyists said they believe 
personal lobbying to be "effective," or "very effective."
The pipeline opponents concentrated on lobbying after the 
pipeline bill was reported to the full Senate. The lands 
coalition lobbied members of Congress heavily throughout 
the course of the issue.
Mary C. Berry says that by the time the Senate took 
up the bill on July 9, 1973, William Foster (Chief lobbyist 
for Alyeska) and other oil lobbyists, aided by the looming 
energy crisis, had succeeded in subtly altering the contro­
versy. "No longer was the question should the pipeline be 
built; it had become where should the pipeline be built,
18Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: 
Rand McMally, 1965), p. 212.
19T, . ,Ibid.
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20a different issue altogether." The coalition's efforts 
in favor of a Canadian route seem to be an acknowledgement 
of this situation.
As previously mentioned, there were to be two major 
amendments on the floor. One was Senator Gravel's pro­
pipeline amendment, the other was the pro-environment 
Mondale-Bayh amendment. Although the coalition was ready 
to lobby for the Mondale-Bayh amendment, it appears they 
made a major error in not being prepared to deal with the 
emergence of the Gravel amendment.
We spent most of our time and efforts 
building up the credibility o£ the 
Canadian alternative, said Richard 
M. Lahn of the Sierra Club. Nobody 
paid much attention to the Gravel 
amendment until about ten days before 
the Senate vote. Until then there 
had not been any sign that the other 
side was lobbying hard on the NEPA 
issue, and it just didn't seem possible 
to lose on this. 2-*-
Yet Alyeska had been working on the proposal for some
time. Said William Foster,
Alyeska spotted a very realistic 
opportunity and worked for the 
Senate amendment. All the owner 
companies, and their friends were ^o
talking to anyone they knew up there.
The coaliton's lobbying efforts, on the other hand, 
were poorly organized. Even after the Senate defeated
20Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 269.
21Richard Corrigan and Claude Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby 
Uses Its Political Muscle to Bypass Environmental Law." 
National Journal 5 (August 11, 1973): p. 1177.
22 Ibid.
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the Mondale-Bayh amendment and voted its support for the
NEPA exclusion, there was still an opportunity to delay a
decision in the House until after the summer recess.
Working out of the office facilities 
made available to them by Representative 
John J. Moakley, they attempted to 
contact by telephone or through personal 
visits as many House members as possible.
But, said George Alderson of Friends of
the Earth, "We just didn't have sufficient 23
staff or organization to get to everybody."
Richard Lahn of the Sierra club voiced a similar opinion.
I knew we were in trouble when I was 
sitting in Representative Claude 
Pepper's office making a pitch to two 
summer interns, and who breezes by me 
but the ARCO lobbyists* (Pepper voted 
to override the NEPA)
In the end, said Gladys Kessler, "There just wasn't enough
time to mobilize a save-the-NEPA campaign around the
25country as we had done last year." H.R. 9081 passed the 
House by a vote of 356 to 60.
Five years later, beginning in 197 8 , representatives 
of the lands coalition lobbied members of Congress throughout 
the entire course of the issue. An article in the Washington 
Post, printed after H.R. 39 had cleared the House Interior 
Committee, reported that both pro-environment and pro-develop­
ment lobbyists, "Have leaned heavily on members of the Interior 
Committee in recent months and are certain to lean just as
23Corrigan and Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby Uses its 
Political Muscle." p. 1178
2 4 .  -j Ibid.
Ibid.
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2 6heavily on all members of Congress in the months ahead."
In discussing the lobbying efforts Representative Seiberling
27said, "I never saw such lobbying m  my whole life."
One House staff member, who works for a 
Congressman on the subcommittee, stated 
that the members of the coalition made 
"frequent visits," and that they kept 
coming in as the bill went all the way 
up in subcommittee, committee and then 
full House. He also said that eight 
different people were in contact with 
his office alone. Other replies from 
congressional staff people reinforce 
this idea that the Alaska Coalition 2q
was very active in its lobbying efforts.
Again the evidence seems to suggest that the pipeline 
coalition failed to achieve the des'ired effects from their 
lobbying attempts, while the lands coalition enjoyed a 
certain amount of success, especially in the House. What 
can be said, then, about the two coalitions' lobbying efforts?
Milbrath says that there are three variables which
are significant in determining the success of a.lobbying
29effort. First, the lobbyist must be knowledgeable. It 
is generally very difficult for a congressman or his staff 
to gather all the information needed to make an accurate 
decision on many issues. Any group which can provide them 
with the information needed will therefore have greater access 
to these decisions and will be able to influence the
2 6"Carving Up Alaska," Washington Post, editorial, 
March 19, 1978.
27Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska 
(D) (2) Lands," p. 46.
29 . . . . .Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 221-225.
decisions made by them. Holtzman discusses this idea in
Interest Groups and Lobbying;
Since legislators want and need staff aid, 
interest groups seek opportunities to supply 
such services. To the extent that they can, 
they strengthen their reservoir of good will 
and their potential for influence. At the 
same time, it must be understood that the 
providing of services is in itself a means 
for directly affecting legislative policy.
Although the pipeline coalition members were all very know­
ledgeable, they did not provide "useful" information for 
the majority of the House and Senate members they sought 
to influence. A synthesis of the various arguments which 
were presented to Congress by Alyeska^ and the pipeline 
coalition shows why this is true. In support of the 
pipeline, advocates argued:
1. Congress has the right to direct the Interior 
Department to issue the permits.
2. In doing so, the NEPA would not be gutted, since 
it applies to actions by federal agencies and 
not Congress.
3. The pipeline has already been subjected to a 
seven million dollar environmental impact study 
as called for by the NEPA.
4. It is past time to begin construction of the 
two-million-barrel-a-day pipeline because of 
our balance of payments and national security 
problems raised by a dependence on overseas oil.
In defense of the NEPA, and against the pipeline, these points
were made:
1. The Interior Department's environmental impact 
report was deliberately stacked against the
^Abraham Holtzman, Interest Groups and Lobbying (New York 
The MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 89.
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Canada alternative, thereby thwarting the 
process of judicial review.
2. By exempting this projectt Congress is 
setting a dangerous precedent.
3. Congress should not attempt to prohibit 
citizens from exercising their rights 
to challenge government actions. 31
Clearly the most damaging argument against the coalition was
the need for additional supplies of oil which the pipeline
would provide. The coalition had no real basis on which
to refute this. On the other hand, their own arguments;
were weak, generally critical of Congress or the Interior
Department, and difficult to defend in the face of consistuents
angered over the lack of gasoline for their automobiles.
Said Representative Donald H. Clausen of California:
We simply cannot afford the luxury of 
bringing all developments to a stand­
still while our country faces the 
dilemma of major energy problems, 
inflated prices, balance-of-payments 
problems... and a slow but forward 
moving erosion of the confidence of 
our people in the will of government 
to solve problems.^2
It seems that a great many Congressmen wanted to make 
a stand in public on their determination to fight the energy 
crisis. For all their knowledge, the coalition was unable 
to provide any information which was useful in this regard.
They could claim the citizen*s right to litigation, and the 
necessity to preserve the NEPA, but they could not show how
31'Corrigan and Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby Uses its Political 
Muscle," p. 1178.
32 Ibid.
stopping the pipeline would not hurt the country energy-wise. 
For many Congressman there was no other choice but to give 
the pipeline a green light. An aid to Senator Jackson 
said, "A lot of Senators wanted to do something about the 
energy crisis and this was their first opportunity to show 
their concern.
By way of comparison, the lands coalition's lobbyists
were knowledgeable, and they provided the House and Senate
staffs with what was described as "good, workable information
It was described at various times as "factual," "to,the point
"concise," and "detailed when detail was needed." Their
data was also "organized in the way that was most useful to
35the staff people and Congressmen."
Many of the staffers, however, saw it as 
being biased. As one put it, "I believe 
what they print, but I don't feel they 
always put everything into print though."
Another stated that they, "may not tell 
you the whole story, but if they tell you 
something, you didn't have to question it."
However, most, if not all, lobbyists 
present information which is at least 
somewhat biased towards their position, 
either by being selective in what is 
presented or in terms of the content 
itself. Congressional staff people 
are aware of this and take factual 
data with the assumption that it is 
biased from each l o b b y . 36
The quality of information and the manner in which it
33Corrigan and Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby Uses Political 
Muscle," p. 1172.
34Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska 
(D) (2) Lands," p. 49.
3 5Ibid.
36Ibid.
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was presented is one factor which hurt the pipeline coalition's
efforts, and helped the lands coalition's efforts. A second
factor which could have helped both of them was belief in
their cause. Milbrath points out that, "the advocate who
is not personally convinced is less successful in pleading 
37his case." Berry found that individuals who work for public
interest groups are generally very committed to what they
were doing.
If there was one thing that was clear from 
the respondent's attitudes during the inter­
views, it was that their work is not just 
a job. There wasn't a single activist who 
gave any indication of anything but^gtrong 
commitment to organizational goals.
All the evidence indicates that the members of both 
coalitions were, indeed, dedicated to their causes. By 
1973 the battle against the pipeline was almost five years 
old, and many of the participants had involved since the 
start— evidence of a certain amount of dedication. Additionally, 
many of the lands coalition members had come from Alaska to 
Washington to work expressly on that issue, indicating the 
strength of their commitment. And all the coalition members 
worked for less pay than their industry counterparts.
The problem is that this is more of a negative factor 
than a positive one. That is, strong belief in your cause, 
while beneficial, in no way guarantees your success; yet its 
absence can significantly reduce your chances. The effect was
37JVIilbrath, Political Participation, p. 223.
3 8Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 100.
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that the faith of both coalitions' in their causes helped 
them, but it did not play a major role in determining the 
outcome.
Another important factor according to Milbrath, is 
using the "soft-sell approach" when trying to influence 
Congressmen. It is apparent that the pipeline coalition, 
with its constant and discordant pleadings, was felt to be 
pushing too hard at times. This was a significant con­
tributor to the backlash which took place in Congress.
Three months ago we were confident this 
(NEPA exclusion) amendment wouldn't pick 
more than fifteen votes. ..The turnabout 
is astonishing. There is ho doubt now ^9 
that there is an environmental backlash.
Alaska's Senator Stevens, never a fan of the anti-pipeline 
forces, said on July 17, "There is no way to start a pipe­
line without stopping all the litigation of these environ-
40mental extremists." Perceptions such as these hurt the
coalition's cause. Yet there was virtually no way to
counteract such an image once it had developed.
The same criticism applies to the lands coalition. One
congressional staff person said that they, "push their point
so strongly that they turn people off. If they were a little
41more tactful, they would be welcomed more." While extremism 
such as this may lead to a backlash in some offices, it does
39 ■ .Corrigan and Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby Uses its
Political Muscle," p. 1172.
40 1^73 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p . 600.
41Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska 
(D) (2) Lands," p. 50.
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not seem to have had a major negative effect on the coalition's
lobbying efforts. As one aide put it, "The industries are
tough, the labor unions are tough, the environmentalists are
42tough. You've got to be."
It appears that although they may have acted over- 
zealously, the lands coalition was able to retain an air 
of professionalism while the pipeline coalition was pictured 
by many as extremists. This was certainly a contributing 
factor in the outcome of the two issues.
STRATEGY III - CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE
The final strategy that Berry discusses relevant to 
this study, is called "constituency influence and pressure." 
Utilization of this strategy occurs primarily when interest 
groups urge their members to write letters to, or otherwise 
pressure, their congressmen. It can also include releasing 
information about a congressman, such as publicizing his 
voting record. In this instance both coalitions relied 
almost exclusively on the first of these: working for a 
grass-roots campaign. However the pipeline coalition did 
not put nearly as much effort into their attempts as did the 
lands coalition.
In all the published reports of the coalition's 
activities there is little memtion of such tactics. In 
1971 the Wilderness Society, on behalf of the coalition, 
mailed out copies of a newsletter entitled: "Alaska Alert:
4 2Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska 
(D) (2) Lands," p. 50.
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Russian Roulette in the Arctic," which urged readers to
43testify or submit statements against the project. Addition­
ally, the Sierra Club published a "Battle Book," called 
44Oil•On Ice, which was sent to both club members and mem­
bers of Congress. This contained the usual call to members, 
urging them to write the congressmen.
The Sierra Club also distributed a packet of clippings 
and statements, complete with picture order forms and 
suggestions on what concerned citizens could do to fight the 
pipeline. Finally, in early 1973 the coalition ran a news­
paper add entitled, "From those wonderful people who brought
4 5you the energy crisis— the trans-Alaska pipeline." This 
add listed those members of congress who were involved in 
making the key decisions, and urged readers to write them 
and let them know they were opposed to the pipeline.
The lands coalition used the publications of its member 
organizations and sent out alerts to its membership in order 
to encourage grass-root participation. Friends of the Earth's 
Not Man Apart magazine, in its May-June 1978 edition, included 
this message: "If ever there was an issue about which to 
write your legislators, this is it. Please write, badger, 
pester your representatives and employers. Don't let them
43Richard Corrigan, "Settlement of Native Land Claims 
Could Affect Alaska Pipeline Controversy," National Journal
3 (April 17, 1971): p. 839.
44Brown, Oil On Ice.
45 . . .Corrigan and Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby Uses its
Political Muscle," p. 1174.
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off the hook...Write, Write, Write." 46 An editorial in
the June 197 8 Sierra magazine echoed these sentiments. 
"Now is a critical time for you to write your Represen-
out these alerts, whenever possible, immediately to critical 
votes in either the House or Senate. In these they would 
urge the recipients to write, telephone, or meet with 
important decision-makers as soon as possible. The Alaska
Coalition Hotline was also established to keep the active
. . . 4 8members of the coalition informed on what was happening.
Morris Udall called the campaign the, "most impressive
49grass-roots effort since the civil rights issue." Many
congressional aides reported receiving a great deal of
constituent input favorable to the coalition's position.
Commenting on the effort, Bob Skowcroft, an active member
50of the coalition said, "We blew them away."
There is no rreal accurate way of measuring the effec­
tiveness of actions such as these. However, it is doubtful 
that such tactics could have made the difference in the 
pipeline battle, even if organized in a logical and effective
46Jeffrey Knight, "The Fight to Save Alaska— Because 
It is There," Not Man Apart, (May-June, 1978): p. 2.
47Edgar Wayburn, "Priority— Update on Alaska,"
Sierra, (July-August, 1978): p. 1.
48Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska 
(D) (2) Lands, p. 52.
tatives and Senators." 47 Additionally, the coalition sent
49 Ibid., p. 53
50 Ibid.
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manner. The loose structure of the coalition, their 
emphasis on litigation and testimony to the exclusion of 
effective lobbying, combined with the power and influence 
of the oil lobby and the effects of the emerging energy 
crisis, all combined to produce the ultimate failure of 
the Alaska Public Interest Coalition.
In comparison, the lands coalition was able to combine 
knowledgeable lobbyists, useful information, and effective 
congressional testimony with an organized grass-roots 
appeal and a broad based coalition structure. This helped 
them achieve their goal of strict.environmental protection 
for the federal lands in Alaska.
Fortunately there was no single dominant issue around 
which their adversaries could gather, like the still-new 
energy crisis of 1973, and organize their opposition. And 
the lands coalition enjoyed the support of the Administration 
while the pipeline coalition did not. However, as the 
evidence of this chapter indicates, it was the ineffective 
use of the strategies of influence by the pipeline coalition 
from 196 8 through 19 73, and their subsequent effective employ­
ment by the lands coalition five years later, which played 
the most important part in the passage of the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 and the protection of 
federal (d) (.2) lands in 1978.
CHAPTER FIVE
The development of public policy— the laws which govern 
our society— is the result of a number of factors. These 
include dominant political events, such as war or other 
international upheavals, the legislators involved and the 
attitudes of his or her constituents, political parties, 
and the interest groups which actively seek to influence 
policy development.
Interest groups are especially important in this
process. As Holtzman noted:
Political action by organized interest 
groups is a fundamental phenomenon of 
modern democratic societies ... (They). 
constitute the principle ayenue outside 
of official public government through 
which political power is marshaled,, 
and applied.1
In Federalist Paper #10, James Madison pointed out that 
conflict between interest groups is to be expected in society. 
Where freedom exists, factions will almost always form and 
attempt to use government to protect and preserve their 
interests.
Interest groups can be divided into two categories—  
private interest groups and public interest groups. There 
are several differences between the two, the most important 
of which is that a private interest group works for self-gain,
^Abraham Holtzman, Interest Groups and Lobbying 
(New York: The MacMillian Company, 1966); p.~1
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or on behalf of the specific group it represents, while a 
public interest group seeks a collective good, the achieve­
ment of which will not selectively benefit the membership 
of the activists of the organization. Berry notes the 
variety of strategies and tactics that public interest groups 
can use in their attempts to influence policy. These include 
the use of law, embarrassment and confrontation, information, 
and constituency influence and pressure.
The topic of this study has been one specific type 
of public interest group— environmental organizations.
Their participation in policy development is a relatively 
new phenomenon, although organizations like the Audubon 
Society and the Sierra Club have worked in this area through­
out most of the century.
One of the most important actions that an environmental 
organization, or indeed any public interest group, can take 
is to form a coalition with other groups of the same persuasion. 
In all the sources cited, coalition formation, or joint 
activities with other groups, was noted to be an important 
factor in successful attempts to influence policy development. 
Deakin noted that virtually every major issue that comes
before Congress involved some type of coalition lobbying,
2and that lobbyists had put much faith in such efforts.
The subjects of this study were two such public interest 
group coalitions: The Alaska Public Interest Coalition (the
2
James Deakin, The Lobbyists (Washington D.C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1966), p. 219.
87
pipeline coalition) and the Alaska Coalition (the lands 
coalition). The similarity of the two coalitions, combined 
'with their varying degrees of success, have been helpful in 
analyzing those factors which contribute to the success or 
failure of a coalition*s lobbying efforts.
One important factor is the composition of coalitions 
seeking to influence public policy. As evidenced by this 
study, a successful coalition should be as broadly based 
as possible and include a varied assortment of interest 
groups from throughout the country. This aids in estab­
lishing the interest being pursued as one of national impor­
tance, effecting individuals from many walks of life. Not 
only does this add legitimacy to the coalition's efforts, 
but it also indicates to the decision makers involved the 
wider implications of this public policy question.
The success of the lands coalition becomes rather more 
probable, comprised as it was of many varied interest groups; 
including environmentalists, unions, liberals, and elites.
This compares with the pipeline coalition which was comprised 
of many separate groups, but few separate interests. A vote 
against the pipeline coalition would therefore alienate mainly 
environmentalists, whereas a vote against the lands coalition 
would upset individuals from different interest groups 
throughout society.
It is also important to have the support of the executive 
branch, especially the President. This is because the President, 
as one individual, commands considerable attention in this 
country. His ability to speak out on any issue and have it
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widely reported can be a tremendous asset. This is in 
addition to the Presidents ability to personally discuss 
issues with key members of Congress and line up support 
from the rank and file on both sides.
The importance of the President's role in this study 
is evidenced by the failure of the pipeline coalition during 
Nixon's Administration and the success of the lands coalition 
during Carter's. Nixon was not supportive of the environ­
mentalists and his executive branch appointees opposed them 
throughout the five year ordeal. On the other hand, Carter 
was clearly sympathetic to the lands coalition and supported 
them because of his feelings. His appointees, especially 
Secretary Andrus, were quite helpful in passing pro-environment 
legislation and in protecting the federal lands. The impor­
tance of the chief executive is even more clearly evidenced 
by the willingness of the lands coalition to compromise when 
Ronald Reagan became President.
In attempting to influence Congress, another important 
factor is proper channelling of the information the 
coalition wishes to provide. A common mistake here is to 
concentrate on Congressional testimony. Although it is part 
of the Congressional information gathering process, testimony 
often serves merely a symbolic function. Many times testimony 
is lined up to conform with preconceived Congressional opinions. 
Most experienced lobbyists rate its usefulness as low, pre­
ferring to expend their efforts in other directions.
Coalition members should instead concentrate more on 
personal lobbying. The best way to get across the information
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one wishes to communicate is by personal contact with the 
individuals who will make the decisions. This may require 
considerable skill and experience on the part of the coalition 
members, but its importance should not be under-emphasized.
Directly related to this is the usefulness of the infor­
mation being presented. The prime interest of any member of 
Congress is to be re-elected. To do this he or she must be 
perceived as doing what is best for his or her constituents, 
and the country as a whole. For a coalition to attract the 
support of a Congressman,it must be able to show how support 
for its position is best for all concerned. As has been 
shown, failure to employ this one factor can significantly 
reduce a coalition's chance for success.
These factors, along with effective use of personal 
lobbying and grass-roots pressure, are some of the more 
important factors affecting the success of coalition lobbying 
which have been illustrated by this study. Coalition lobbying 
remains today one of the most effective ways for small and 
diverse public interest groups to participate in the 
democratic process.
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